Menefee: "The Oar of Odysseus": Landlocked and "Geographically Disadvantag

CALIFORNIA WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 23

1992-1993

NUMBER 1
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SAMUEL PYEATr MENEFEE*
You must take a well-cut oar and go on till you reach a people who know

nothing of the sea and never use salt with their food, so that our crimsonpainted ships and the long oars that serve those ships as wings are quite
beyond their ken. And this will be your cue-a very clear one, which you
cannot miss. When you fall in with some other traveller who speaks of the
"winnowing-fan" you are carrying on your shoulder, the time will come
for you to plant your shapely oar m the earth and offer Lord Poseidon the
rich sacrifice of a ram, a bull, and a breeding boar.
Homer, Odyssey'
INTRODUCTION

Like Homer's mythical sailor, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention has
found a strange home, far from the ocean's roar. Devised to regulate the

* J.D. Harvard Law School; LL.M. (Oceans), University of Virginia School of Law. Maury
Fellow, Center for Oceans Law and Policy and I.M.B. Fellow, I.C.C.-International Maritine
Bureau. Vice Chairman, Maritime Law Association Committee on the International Law of the
Sea. Author (with Moore and Pires Filho) of Materials on Oceans Law (1982) and of numerous
articles on oceans-related topics. Special thanks go to Prof. Martin Ira Glassner for his general.
encouragement of work on this topic. The views expressed in this article (and any errors) are
those of the author alone.
1. Speech of Teiresias to Odysseus, Odyssey, Book XI, 101-74, in HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 174
(E.V. Rieu trans., 1969); see also GEORGIOS A. MEGAS, FOLKTALE OF GREECE xiv (Helen
Colaclides trans., 1970), which mentions that "[iun a tale still told, the Prophet Elijah was a
sailor weary of the sea who walked with an oar on his shoulder to a place where people would
mistake it for a shovel. He reached a mountain top, settled, and there he is worshipped."
Megas goes on to note a "version known at the present time to Greek sailors, who link the
episode to their patron saint, Nicholas. Maine lobstermen tell a purely secular and bawdy form,
a witness to its circulation over the centuries among the international fraternity of seafarers."
Id. at xiv-xv; see also Stilpon P. Kyriakides, The Language and Folk Culture of Modern Greece,
in STILPON P. KYRIAKIDES, TWO STUDIES ON MODERN GREEK FOLKLORE 97 (Robert A.
Georges & Aristotle A. Katranides trans., 1968); IRWIN T. SANDERS, RAINBOW IN THE ROCK:
THE PEOPLE OF RURAL GREECE 35 (1962); RICHARD M. DORSON, REGIONAL FOLKLORE INTHE
UNITED STATES: BUYING THE WIND 38-39 (1964); Robert A. Georges, Addenda to Dorson's
'The Sailor Who Went Inland', 79 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN FOLKLORE 373-74 (1966) (noting that
St. Elias is also associated with the tradition).
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uses of the sea, this Convention, when it enters into force2 will include
several provisions in the treaty structure applying to landlocked and
otherwise geographically disadvantaged states.3
Commentary concerning such nations has concentrated largely on
UNCLOS III (the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea),
the 1982 Convention, and its controversies. 4 Despite the existence of an
excellent bibliography5 and occasional historical discussions of individual
states,6 no extended general overview exists of the problem in its historical

2. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5
(1983) [hereinafter UNCLOS 1982]. According to art., 308(1), the Convention will enter into
force 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth ratification or accession. See 1 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 339 (Myron Nordquist,
ed. 1985). As of November, 1992, the following 54 states have ratified: Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Costa Rica,
C6te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Federated States
of Micronesia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq,
Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Namibia (UN Council for),
Nigeria, Oman, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of
Tanzania, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.
3. See UNCLOS 1982, arts. 58, 62, 69-72, 82, 87, 90, 124-32, 140-41, 148, 150, 152, 238,
256, 266, 269, 272, 274. See NORDQUIST, supra note 2, at 229, 231-32, 235-38, 242, 244,

255-57, 260, 263, 264, 268, 313, 320, 323, 324, 325. Additionally it could be argued that arts.
122-23, dealing with enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, by their very nature relate to geographical
disadvantage. See id. at 255. Other articles of course apply generally to these countries.

4. See, e.g., ANDREW MPAZI SINJELA, LAND-LOCKED STATES AND THE UNCLOS REGIME
(1983); Susan Ferguson, UNCLOS III: Last ChanceforLand-locked States?, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 637 (1977); Martin Ira Glassner, The Landlocked States at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITrEE ON MARINE GEOGRAPHY
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 119 (1978); Martin Ira Glassner, Final
Report of the Committee on Land-locked States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 75 (1983-84); Martin Ira Glassner, Land-locked States
and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 9 MARINE POLICY REPORTS 8 (Sept. 1986); M.A.

Suliaman, Free Access: The Problem of Land-locked States and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 So. AFRICAN Y.B. INT'L L. 144 (1984); Ibrahim J. Wani,

An Evaluation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea from the Perspective of the Landlocked
States, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1982).
5. MARTIN IRA GLASSNER, BIBuOGRAPHY ON LAND-LOCKED STATES (1980); BEI1OGRAPHY
ON LAND-LOCKED STATES: SECOND REVISED AND ENLARGED EDITION (Martin I. Glassner, ed.
1986) (listing over 1068 citations); BIBUOGRAPHY ON LAND-LOCKED STATES: THIRD REVISED
AND ENLARGED EDITION (Martin I. Glassner, ed. 1991) (listing over 1726 citations).
6. Among the best of these are the discussions of the problems of Afghanistan, Bolivia, and
Uganda from a historical perspective in MARTIN IRA GLASSNER, ACCESS TO THE SEA FOR
DEVELOPING LAND-LOCKED STATES 39-83, 84-136, 137-82 (1970).
Other studies, while
apparently concentrating on a single country, lack thorough (indeed, sometimes any) historical
grounding. Additionally, landlocked states such as San Marino, Liechtenstein, the Vatican City,
Rwanda, Bhutan, and Mongolia have had little or nothing written about the historical aspects of
this problem. Nor has work been done on former landlocked states, on the new landlocked
states of the '90s (many created as a result of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.), or on the
historical geographical disadvantage faced by many states with a limited access to the sea.
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perspective.' The purpose of this article, then, will be to view landlocked
and geographically disadvantaged states historically down to the time of the
Third United Nations Conference and to comment on major legal developments which have occurred in this area. Such a survey will perforce be
somewhat impressionistic, but it will provide a useful background to this
continuing contemporary problem.
LANDLOCKED AND "GEOGRAPHICALLY DISADVANTAGED"

STATES:

A

BACKGROUND

"Landlocked states," simply defined, are those nations which possess no

seacoast."

Scattered across four continents-Europe, Africa, Asia, and

7. Again, the most useful work to date is Glassner's Access to the Sea, with a discussion of
slightly over twenty pages divided into a) "Developments Through the Nineteenth Century" (id.
at 17-19), b) "The Barcelona Conventions of 1921" (id. at 20-22), c) "Developments After
World War 1I" (id. at 22-29), d) "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea" (id.
at 29-32), e) "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development" (id. at 32-35), and
f) "The Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States" (id. at 35-38). See id. at 16-38.
Glassner's work, however, devotes little space to pre-18th century developments. Id. at 17-18.
8. See, e.g. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 2 ("[tlhe term land-locked means having no seacoast
whatever, being completely mediterranean."); Jeffrey Povolny, Landlocked States and the Law
of the Sea, 2 MARINE PouLcY REPORTS at 1 (Mar. 1980) ("Landlocked states have no coastlines
and enjoy no direct access to the sea"); R. Makil, Transit Rights of Land-locked Countries: An
Appraisal of International Conventions, 4 J. WORLD TRADE ABR. LAW 35 (1970) ("[l]andlocked countries by definition are countries which do not have sea coasts"); Patrick Childs, The
Interests of Land-locked States in Law of the Seas, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701 (1972) ("having
no direct access to the sea within the boundaries of their territorial jurisdiction"). UNCLOS
1982, art. 124 (1) (a) defines "land-locked state" as one "which has no sea-coast."
1
NORDQUIST, supra note 2, at 255. Caflisch notes that "[alt first glance, the definition of a landlocked state does not seem to offer any difficulty" though he goes on to note Iraqi and Jordanian
arguments "that they could almost be assimilated to land-locked countries because they have but
one small and narrow outlet on a semi-enclosed sea." Lucius C. Caflisch, Land-Locked and
Geographically DisadvantagedStates and the New Law of the Sea in 7 THESARUS ACROASIUM,
343, 347 (1977).

B
12
A

SEA

C

Two questions lurk here, the first being whether a country must be landlocked if it has no
seacoast and the second, whether there are circumstances which may cause it to be landlocked

if it does. Arguing theoretically, one may posit the existence of three countries (A, B, C), two
which (A and C) have sea coasts and one of which (B) does not. If these states are separated
from each other by rivers (1 and 2) it is possible for a geographical situation to exist in which
B would have no seacoast, but yet, using an equidistance principle, would have territorial
jurisdiction which touched the sea. In such a case it would appear that B would not be
landlocked. The arguments raised by Jordan and Iraq lead to the second question, which finds
a more interesting manifestation in the current existence of Uzbekistan, a state which abuts on
the (totally enclosed) Aral Sea. Arguably Uzbekistan has a seacoast, but is it not in fact
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South America-these countries constitute about one fifth of the world's
nations, but represent only eight and one half percent of its land area and
four percent of its population." While European states such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Hungary are considered developed, many
non-European landlocked countries fall into the very poor "basket case"
category. 1 Thus while lack of ports and direct access to the shiplanes of the
world can affect all these nations, they particularly exacerbate the poverty of
the latter group.
Geographically, the only thing these states have in common is their
landlocked status. They vary widely in size, but it is also true that no really
large state is landlocked." All depend upon one or more states for their
access to the sea (only Liechtenstein is a landlocked state, itself completely
bordered by other landlocked nations-Austria and Switzerland)." In some
cases they are completely surrounded by other countries, as San Marino is
by Italy, or Lesotho by South Africa." Outside of Europe, only Malawi,
Lesotho, and Bolivia are within 300 miles of the sea; 5 only Bolivia and
Zambia have easy potential access to two oceans. 6 Again, if one excepts
the European waterway system, only the Central African Republic, Laos,
Bolivia, and Paraguay have access to river transport linking these states with
the sea. 7 Landlocked states, such as Chad, Mali, and Niger are located in
geographical pockets of poverty-their coastal neighbors are often only

landlocked? Problems such as these indicate both the inherent difficulty in coining a universally
concise definition of "landlocked" and the consequent utility of the more amorphous epithet
'geographically disadvantaged."
9. See Table I, infra. Authorities differ as to the number of states include, which of course
vary over time. According to Povolny, writing in 1980, "[blefore World War II, there were
twelve landlocked states in the world, now there are thirty." Povolny, supra note 8, at 1; see
also Lewis M. Alexander, The disadvantaged states and the law of the sea, 5 MARINE POLICY
185 (1981); Wani, supra note 4, at 628. Makil, however, gives the number as twenty-eight,
and Glassner, writing in 1970, speaks of "the thirty-five landlocked states and other territories.
See Makil, supra note 8, at 35; GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 4. But see Martin Ira Glassner,
Developing Land-Locked States and The Resources of the Seabed, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633,
634 (1974) (giving the number as "some 26"). The listing given in Table I, although ignoring
autonomous regions in Yugoslavia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, nonetheless
lists 48 landlocked entities, some of which have indeterminate international status. The vexed
question of what constitutes a "state" is obviously responsible for some of the numerical
disparities, at the same time, it is clear that the number of landlocked states is increasing.
10. See Childs, supra note 8, at 701; Ferguson, supra note 4, at 637 n.l. These estimates all
antedate the historic events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union-all are obviously
higher today.
11. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 185; Povolny, supra note 8, at 1; Glassner, supra note 9,
at 634.
12. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 4.
13. Cafliach, supra note 8, at 352.
14. Id. at 352 n.16.
15. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 4.
16. Id. at 5 (noting that Afghanistan and Rwanda also have some choice).
17. See id.at 8.
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Some, like Mongolia and Afghanistan are forced to
marginally richer.1
eschew the most direct route to the sea because of political considerations.19
Historically, the landlocked countries tend to fall into four major
First, there are those smaller enclaves which have never
categories.'
combined into larger nation-states, such as San Marino, Liechtenstein, and
Andorra. In medieval Europe, and up into the nineteenth century, many
mini-states lacked access to the sea, and while some gained this through
merger, a few have been arrested in their development. A second group of
landlocked countries resulted from the collapse of colonial systems-Spain's
South American Empire in the early nineteenth century (Bolivia and
Paraguay), the African colonies of Britain (Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi,
Zimbabwe), Belgium (Rwanda, Burundi), and France (Chad, Mali, Niger,
Burkina Faso), French Indochina (Laos), and the European and Asiatic
constituents of the U.S.S.R. (Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Kirgizstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) in the twentieth century. Most, though not all,
of these countries enjoyed better access to the sea under their colonial
overlords; it was the pressures of independence and new nationhood which
brought with it local quarrels and regional fragmentation. A related third
group are those landlocked states which have resulted from the dismemberment of great powers. Serbia, as part of the Ottoman Empire, and Poland,
created out of Imperial Germany, are two historical examples, but perhaps
the most enduring legacy of this type resulted from the partition of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, creating Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Austria.2 1 Finally, there is a group of landlocked states
which serve as buffers between great powers: Mongolia (Russia and China),
Afghanistan (Russia, China, and, formerly, British India), Nepal (China and
India) and arguably Switzerland and Luxembourg in Europe.' Landlocked
countries, therefore, represent nations which have either not been incorporat18. See id.; Alexander, supra note 9, at 186.
19. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 185-86.

20. This division owes a certain debt to Martin Glassner's analysis of the subject. He notes
four historical categories serving three functional purposes, but defines these differently than the
divisions given above.
The oldest are those which are essentially remnants of fragmented medieval Europe.
...
Second are those which emerged from the collapse of the Spanish American
Empire.... Next are those which emerged a century later as successor states of the
old Austro-Hungarian Empire. . . . Youngest of all are those former colonies and
protectorates of European powers in Africa.... This leaves only those in Asia to
be accounted for. Each has a distinctive national history....
Functionally, the land-locked states can be categorized as buffer states, refugee
states and administrative conveniences.
GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 9-10.
21. Obviously these groupings are for convenience and are liable to varying interpretations.
Thus the U.S.S.R. 's demise could be considered either the collapse of a colonial system or the
dismemberment of a great power.
22. Liechtenstein can also be viewed either as a historical survival or as a buffer between
Austria and Switzerland.
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ed into larger entities or which have resulted from the collapse of larger
nation-states or colonial systems. Additionally, as Eric Fisher has noted,
there is a continuing tendency for nations to "seek the sea," thus decreasing
the number of landlocked states. 3
As a group, landlocked states not only lack port and sea access, but they
must generally depend on other states for transport facilities. This leads to
reduced bargaining power and to the recognition of their dependency on
other countries; a status which has been described by Glassner as "national
claustrophobia" or "a feeling of geographic strangulation.'
Mention is also necessary of the theories under which landlocked states
have access to the seas. In one, based on "natural right" or on "freedom of
the seas," the argument runs that "[i]f the ocean is free to all mankind [res
communis], it is reasonable to suppose that every people should have access
to the shores of the ocean and the right to navigate all navigable rivers
discharging into it, since they are 'only a natural prolongation of the free
high seas. ' "'
A second idea holds that rights of access arose from
"freedom of transit" or from the related shared goal of "expansion of
international trade and economic development."'
Finally, there is a
minority position that transit under such circumstances constitutes a "public
law servitude"-a customary right-of-way to the sea.27
TABLE

Country/Region

I.

LANDLOCKED STATES OR AREAS*
AND
2
THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 8

Area

Adjacent Territories

(miles 2)

[landlocked]

Population
(year est.)

Europe
*Andorra

181

France, Spain

54,507

23. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 11.
24. See id.at 13-14.
25. See Norman J.G. Pounds, A Free and Secure Access to the Sea, 49 ANNALS OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 257 (1959), quoted in GLASSNER, supra note 6, at

16; Lucius C. Caflisch, Land-Locked States and Their Access to andfrom the Sea, 49 BR. Y.B.
INT'L L. 71, 78 (1979).
26. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 16-17; see also Caflisch, supra note 25, at 78 (noting that
this may be asserted "regardless of whether transit is or is not effected with a view of obtaining
access to and from the sea.").
27. See Caflisch, supra note 25, at 79; GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 16 (claiming that this view
had little support and is almost extinct today).
28. As previously indicated, see supra note 10, many autonomous regions have been excluded
from this table. Asterisks do not (necessarily) indicate that the areas they represent do not have
some or all the attributes of states, only that their exact political status is subject to varying
amounts of question, because of conflicting claims, recent independence, lack of some commonly
recognized state attribute, etc. Population and area figures are taken from the 1992 Britannica
Book of the Year, the Statesman's Yearbook for 1992-1993 and the 1983 Britannica Book of the
Year. Brackets for these numbers indicate adjustment of figures from the totals given in those
works.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol23/iss1/2

6

Menefee: "The Oar of Odysseus": Landlocked and "Geographically Disadvantag

19921

LANDLOCKED STATES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(1990)
Austria

32,377

Germany, Italy,
Yugoslavia, [Loichtenstein, Switzerland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia]

7,812,100
(1991)

Belarus

80,200

Russia, Ukraine, Poland,
Lithuania, Latvia

10,260,400
(1991)

Czechoslovakia

49,382

Germany, Poland,
Ukraine, Austria,
Hungary

15,667,666
(1991)

Hungary

35,920

Yugoslavia, [Austria,
Czechoslovakia],
Romania, Ukraine

10,375,323
(1991)

62

[Austria, Switzerland]

28,452
(1990)

*Liechtenstein

Luxembourg

999

*Macedonia
(Yugoslavia)

9,928

Moldova

Belgium, France,
Germany
Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia
([Serbia]), Bulgaria

13,000

Ukraine, Romania

385,317
(1991)
2,033,964
(1991)
4,366,100
(1991)

*San Marino

24

*Serbia
(Yugoslavia)

21,609

Yugoslavia (Croatia, [BosniaHerzegovina], Montenegro,
[Macedonia]) Albania,
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary

5,753,825
(1991)

Switzerland

15,943

France, Germany,
Italy, [Liechtenstein,
Austria]

6,750,000
(1991)

*Vatican City

.17

Italy

Italy

23,108
(1991)

c. 1000
(n.d.)

Africa

*Bophuthatswana
(Republic of South
Africa)
Botswana

15,610

224,607

Republic of South Africa,
Botswana
Namibia, Republic of
South Africa,
[Zimbabwe, Zambia]
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Burkina Faso

105,946

[Upper Volta]
Burundi

Ivory Coast, Ghana,

Ghana, Togo, Benin,
[Niger, Mali]
10,740

[Vol. 23
9,012,000
(1990)

Zaire, Tanzania,
[Rwanda]

5,356,266
(1991)

Central African
Republic

240,324

Cameroon, Congo,
Zaire, Sudan, [Chad]

2,875,000
(1990)

Chad

495,755

Libya, Nigeria,
Cameroon, Sudan,
[Niger, Central African Republic]

5,678,000
(1990)

[427,100]

Lesotho

11,720

Republic of South Africa

1,760,200
(1990)

Malawi

45,747

Mozambique, Tanzania,
[Zambia]

8,831,000
(1990)

478,841

Mauritania, Senegal,
Guinea, Ivory Coast,
Algeria, [Chad, Mali,
Burkina Faso, Niger]

8,151,000
(1990)

458,075

Benin, Nigeria, Libya,
Algeria, [Chad, Mali,
Burkina Faso]

8,040,000
(1991)

Zaire, Tanzania, [Burundi,
Uganda]

7,232,000
(1990)

Niger

Rwanda
Swaziland
Uganda
*Venda
(Republic of
South Africa)

10,169
6,704

Somalia, Kenya, Sudan,
(Eritrea), ([Tigre]), Djibouti

[48,293,785]
(1991)

Ethiopia

Union of South Africa,
Mozambique

770,000
(1990)

93,070

Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya,
Sudan, [Rwanda]

17,213,400
(1991)

2448

Republic of South Africa

[459,986]
(1985)

Zambia

290,568

Angola, Namibia,
Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zaire, [Zimbabwe, Malawi]

8,456,000
(1990)

Zimbabwe

150,873

Namibia, Republic of South
Africa, Mozambique,
[Zambia, Botswana]

9,600,000
(1991)

Afghanistan

251,825

Turkmenistan, [Uzuekistan],
[Tajikistan], Iran, Pakistan

15,592,000
(1990)
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Armenia

11,500

Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Iran

3,376,000
(1991)

Bhutan

18,150

India, [Sikkim, Tibet]

1,442,000
(1990)

*Danan and Diu
(India)

43

India

101,439
(1991)

*Jammu and
Kashmi (India)

85,805

Pakistan, India, China,
[Afghanistan]

7,718,700
(1991)

Kirzstan

76,600

[Tajikistan], [Uzbekistan],
Kazakh an, China

4,222,200
(1991)

Laos

91,400

Burma, Thailand, Cambodia
Vietnam, China

4,024,000
(1990)

Russia, China

2,116,000

Mongolia

604,800

(1990)
Nepal

56,827

*Sikkim
(India)

2,740

Tajikistan

55,300

India, (Sikkim, Tibet]
India, [Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan]

18,917,000
(1990)
405,505
(1991)

[Uzbekistan], [Kirgizstan],
[Afghanistan], China

5,358,300
(1991)
2,196,010
(1990)

*Tibet
(China)

471,700

India, China [Nepal, Sikkim,
Bhutan]

Uzbekistan

172,700

Turkmenistan, Kazakhistan,
[Kirgizstan], [Tajikistan],
[Afghanistan]

Bolivia

424,164

Peru, Chile, Argentina,
Brazil, [Paraguay]

7,322,000
(1990)

Paraguay

157,048

Argentina, Brazil,
[Bolival

4,279,500
(1990)

20,708,200
(1991)

South America

*exact political status in question
States which do not fall into the landlocked category may yet be
This grouping, which
classified as "geographically disadvantaged."'

29. As has been indicated above, see supra note 8, this term is open to varying definitions.
Alexander and Hodgson call it "[o]ne of the more ambiguous terms to have surfaced in recent
law of the sea negotiations" while Caflisch states that "[tihe question of what is a 'geographically disadvantaged' State ... is extremely disputed." Lewis M. Alexander & Robert D.
Hodgson, The Role of the Geographically DisadvantagedStates in the Law of the Sea, 13 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 558 (1975-76); Caflisch, supra note 8, at 346. UNCLOS 1982, art. 70 (2)
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became popular during negotiation for the Third Law of the Sea Conference
initially applied to shelf-locked states, often abutting enclosed or semienclosed seas. Subsequently, however, the net was more widely cast;
Professor Alexander, for example suggests a total of twelve factors to be

used in identifying group members.'
of "seriously disadvantaged"

(The first seven would be indicative

states, and the last five of "nominally

disadvantaged" countries.)
1)
2)
3)

Limited length of coastline
Restricted continental shelf
Restricted continental margin and/or exclusive economic
or fisheries zone
Limited resource potential in the exclusive economic or
fisheries zone

4)
5)

Isolated location

6)

Lack of economic zone

7)

Status as "least developed state"

8)

Zone-locked status

9)

Shelf-locked status

10)

Heavy dependence for nutritional needs on exploitation
of living resources in economic or fisheries zones of
neighboring states

defines "geographically disadvantaged States" (for the purposes [Exclusive Economic Zone]
only) as:
coastal States, including States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose
geographical situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the living
resources of the exclusive economic zones of other States in the subregion or region
for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of their populations or parts
thereof, and coastal states which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own.
1 NORDQUIST, supra note 2, at 236. Useful discussion of geographical disadvantage occur in
Alexander & Hodgson, supra; and Alexander, supra note 9.
30. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 187-90. This appears to have been developed from the
groups listed by Alexander and Hodgson from years earlier:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Land-locked states
States with limited coastlines (1)
States with small continental margins or economic zones (see 3;
also see 8)
Shelf-locked states (9; also see 2)
States with indications of limited resource potential in prospective
economic zones (see 4)
States in isolated locations (5)
Developing states producing minerals/raw materials which may be
affected by seabed mining (12)
Developing states dependent on the exploitation of other states'
economic zones to satisfy nutritional needs (10)
States which can claim no economic zone (6)
Least-developed countries (7)

Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 29, at 561-67.
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11)
12)

Location on an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea
Major exporter of minerals which will be derived from the Area

It is perhaps not surprising that by the criteria of this list some 56 countries
are disabled or seriously disadvantaged, while 46 have a nominally
disadvantaged status.3 While the concept of geographical disadvantage is
new in its application to oceans law, an historical survey will suggest that it
has played an important geo-political role from early times. Having
therefore introduced the general concepts of this study, let us proceed to a
chronological evaluation of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
states and their problems. 2
"MARCH TO THE SEA": LANDLOCKED ORIGINS
AND THE CLASSICAL WORLD

Seen in the terms of this study, the earliest groups to suffer from a
geographically disadvantaged status included those Bedouin tribes whose
access to the Mediterranean was blocked by Egyptian expansion along the
eastern coast of that sea circa 1430-1300 B.C.33 In a similar way, early
Greek settlement in Asia Minor in the ninth through seventh centuries B.C.
must have infringed on some coastal contacts for the kingdoms of the
interior.' To the extent that such settlements may be considered colonial
in nature they illustrate one of the earliest applications of a truism repeated
down through history; the connection between overseas colonization and
landlocked or disadvantaged states for neighboring areas located in the
hinterlands. This same general period offers another early example of the
fluid dynamics of nations as regards their oceanic access; the tendency of
major empires to expand in ways which obviated prior disadvantaged status-which might be termed a national "march to the sea." Thus the Assyrian
Empire under Shalmaneser 11 (860-825 B.C.) had only a limited opening onto
the Mediterranean and lacked any access at all to the Persian Gulf.3 5 By the
time of Assurbanipal, some two centuries later, the latter goal had been
achieved, while the entire seaboard of present day Lebanon and Israel had

31. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 188-89. These computations were made in 1981; recent
changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union might result in different figures.
32. The following sections are not strictly chronological, particularly as regards the case
studies, where it has occasionally been felt important to bring the historical analysis of a
particular country or area down to the present. No claim is made that all major examples have
been touched upon (an impossibility in a study of this brevity) or that those which have been
used have been covered completely. What is important is the historical background given the
question.
33. See WI1jAM R. SHEPHERD, HISTORICAL ATLAs 4 (8th ed. 1956).
34. See id. at 5.
35. Id.
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been incorporated into the Assyrian Empire.'
In a similar manner, the
sparring between Greece and Persia in the 6th century B.C. resulted from
Persian 3pressures
against Greek cities lying between that Empire and the
7
Aegean.
Even when a great empire, such as Alexander's had been created, its
breakup led to inequities when access to the sea was considered. The
Kingdom of Ptolemy, for example (c. 301 B.C.) had more than its fair share
of frontage in the Mediterranean, largely at the expense of the Kingdom of
Seleucus. 3 As might have been expected, this situation was subject to
change; by 200 B.C. the Kingdom of Seleucus had expanded along the
Mediterranean at the expense of Egypt, seizing Cilicia and the Phoneician
littoral. ' Furthermore, the conquests of Antiochus III (223-187 B.C.),
while restoring much of Seleucus's former eastern territories, resulted in
cutting Parthia off from the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and in making
Bactria totally landlocked.'
The Romans, too, from their early Italian conquests4 1 on, left a flotilla
of geographically disadvantaged neighbors in their wake. The Second Punic
War (218-202 B.C.) resulted in acquisition of Hither and Farther Baetica on
the southern coast of Spain, and in 146 B.C. the littoral area around
Carthage itself came under Roman control.42 The shores of western
Anatolia followed slightly over ten years later,43 Narbonensis (southern
France) in 121 B.C., part of north Africa in 107 B.C. and Cilicia in 102."
Often the process involved first granting a protectorate and subsequently
incorporating the shoreside real estate into Rome's growing empire.45
Additionally, geographically disadvantaged nations, such as the Kingdom of
Pergamon and landlocked states like Greater Armenia (an ally of King
Mithradates) gained access to the littoral through the extension of Roman
influence.'
Eventually the Empire covered the shores of the Mediterra-

36. Id. Indeed, the earlier struggles of the Tribes of Israel with the Philistines and the
Canaanites (Phoenicians) during the period 1250-722 B.C. could themselves be viewed as a
possible Jewish push to the sea. See id. at 6-7.
37. See id. at 8, 12-13. Again this can be linked to the geographical disadvantage caused
inland cultures by the coastal colonies of seafaring peoples such as the Greeks and the
Phoenicians. See id. at 12.
38. See id. at 18.
39. See id. at 19.
40. See id. For further discussion of Antiochus III and Bactria, see infra text at notes 64 and
67-68.
41. See SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 29.
42. See id. at 34-35.
43. In 133 B.C. See id. at 35.
44. See id. at 34-35.
45. This was the case with Bithynia and the Kyden of the Cimmerian Bosperous. See id. at
33.
46. See id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol23/iss1/2

12

Menefee: "The Oar of Odysseus": Landlocked and "Geographically Disadvantag

1992]

LANDLOCKED STATES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

nean, much of the Black Sea and even included parts of the Red, Caspian,
and North Sea shorelines.'
The disintegration of the Empire also saw changes in geographical
advantage. No longer did Roman rule reach the Caspian and North Seas,
while the northerly coast of the Black Sea also fell under non-Roman
influence." In the west, the Vandals occupied the shores of North Africa,
while the Sueves and West Goths partially blocked imperial access to the
Atlantic.' 9 Tribal migrations and conquests from the north and east brought
new groups into the crumbling Empire, which formed the nucleus for
landlocked territories such as those occupied by the Alans and the
Burgundians.' In consequence, the collapse of Roman rule and the rise of
the Dark Ages saw a consequent increase in landlocked and geographically
disadvantaged entities.
CASE STUDY: THE THOUSAND CITIES OF BACTRIA

"The Thousand Cities of Bactria," known throughout the Hellenistic
world,51 are, alas, a thousand enigmas today. As Woodcock notes, any
histories which may have been written concerning this easterly outpost of
Greek civilization were swept away by nomadic invasions in the first century
B.C.52 Yet it seems clear that
the . . .events which made Bactria independent are to be found in the
wealth of the country, which the local settlers were disinclined to surrender
to outside rulers, and in the character and strength of the Greek population.
No familiarity with the wastelands and deserts of blown sand that in our
century cover most of northern Afghanistan can give any conception of the
fertility of Bactria in Hellenistic times. Then it was a green land full of
pastures and gardens, the Jewel of Iran.... . The Greek historian
Apollodorus states explicitly that it was the fertility of their land that made
the Bactrian Greeks powerful. Beyond the tilled fields stretched the wide
grazing grounds on which were reared the great herds of Bactrian horses
that provided mounts for both the Greek and the Iranian cavalry. But the
richly productive and well-watered soil was not the only source of Bactria's
wealth. The province stood at the commercial cross-roads of Asia, and if
the Bactrian Greeks did not initiate the trade routes of this region....
they were the first to open out and develop them. The route from India
went northward to Bactria, the capital, and westward through the city's

47. See id. at 34-35.
48. See id. at 42-43, 48.
49. See id. at 48.
50. See id.
51. George Woodcock notes this is a "proverbial phrase" of the Greeks and states that, based
on the remarks of the second century B.C. traveller Chang-k'ien, who records seventy walled

cities in one border province that "it is likely that there were at least several hundred fortified
places in Bactria proper in his time." GEORGE WOODCOCK, THE GREEKS IN INDIA 63 (1966).
These were, perhaps more properly, fortified villages. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 68.
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markets and bazaars
passed the silk trade from China and the gold caravans
from Siberia. 3

In the 6th century B.C., Scylax, a Greek in the service of King Darius,
appears to have traversed this area before sailing down the Indus at the
king's command to the Arabian Sea, and coasting westward to Egypt.'

More commonly, east-west contact appears to have been by land, along the
trade routes.55 Even so, Bactria was considered the remote corner of the
Achaemenian Empire, and acquired the reputation of a fifth century Siberia
to which the Persians dispatched, among others, Ionian Greek exiles.' It
was here (in 327 B.C.) that Alexander the Great pursued the satrap Bessus,
pretender to Darius' title. 57 Besides establishing numerous cities in Bactria
and reorganizing the system of government,58 Alexander, after his foray
into India, followed the example of Scylax in descending the Indus. With
eighty light warships and about one thousand total vessels, he followed the
river to its mouth, explored the Indus delta, and sailed on the Arabian Sea,
before dispatching his navy west to the Persian Gulf and personally marching

his army back toward the setting sun. That Alexander grasped the strategic
importance of the river for Bactria and his other landlocked conquests is
suggested by his founding of three new cities along its coast-two with
shipyards and one at the river's mouth. Ironically, however, it was his eastwest land routes which survived and flourished. 59

Seleucis, a lieutenant of Alexander's, who finally established his rights
to that leader's Asian conquests, turned his attention to Bactria in 306 when
the local satrap declared himself independent. While Seleucid authority was
53. Id. at 63.
54. See id. at 17-20; M. CARY & E.H. WARMINGTON, THE ANCIENT EXPLORERS 61-62
(1929); AUGUSTE TOUSSAINT, HISTORY OF THE INDIAN OCEAN 24-27 (June Guicharnaud trans.
1966).
55. See H.C. RAWUINSON, BACTRIA: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE EXTINCTION OF
BACTRIO-GREEK RULE IN THE PUNJAB 2 (1978 [1908]) ("It lay directly in the great trade route
to India: the caravans, then as now, passed through Kabul and Kandahar on their way from India
to the Caspian and Asiatic ports. ....
"); WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 16 ("For two hundred
years the Greeks had been passing to and fro along the trade routes that linked India with the
Persian empire and the Indian cities of Asia Minor, and their journeys had been magnified into
legend-the tales of the expeditions to India by the Greek gods Dionysus and Heracles. ...
.")
id.at 48 ("trade along the great main route from Patalipurta through Taxila and Alexandria-ofthe-Caucasus to Bactria and Persia, and thence by caravan and sea to the Greek island of
Delos. ....").

56. See RAWUNSON, supra note 55, at 23 ("The Persian commanders before the battle of Lade
tried to coerce the wavering rebels with threats of 'Transportation to Bactria!'").
57. Id. at 24-28; WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 28.
58. WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 28; RAWJNSON, supra note 55, at 28-35 (giving evidence
that at least some of these towns were built as a place to leave his less trustworthy troops on his
advance to India).
59. See WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 39-41, Woodcock suggests that the two cities with
shipyards-"one at the junction of the Chenab and the Indus and another lower down the river"
may not have been completed. The third was located "at Patila, at the mouth of the Indus, near
to the site of present-day Hyderabad . . . . " Id. See also CARY & WARMINGTON, supra note 54,
at 62-66; TOUSSAINT, supra note 54, at 28-32.
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successfully asserted over the population, these breakaway tendencies may
be seen as prophetic.' According to Woodcock,
lack of any real identity of aim between the Seleucid dynasty and the
Greeks of Bactria made the break almost inevitable. The rulers in Antioch
saw Bactria as a province whose wealth should be used for the general
advantage of their empire. The Bactrian Greeks, on the other hand, did
not see any advantage for themselves in the Seleucid connection. They had
reached an excellent understanding with their Iranian neighbours, and had
not yet begun to regard the nom
of Central Asia as a serious threat on
their frontiers.

. ..

Apparently, sometime around 256 B.C. Diodotus Soter, a governor appointed
by Antiochus I, precipitated the break by declaring himself King of
Bactria.
This revolt was quickly followed by a Parthian uprising to the
west; indeed Diodotus II of Bactria helped maintain his country's independence by forming an alliance with Parthia against the Seleucids. While this
pact was successful in its political objective, it had the cultural effect of
isolating the Bactrians from their fellow Greeks.' At about the same time,
landlocked Bactria came under pressure from Scythian tribes to the east; this
indeed served as the basis for a threat exercised successfully by King
Euthydemus in retaining his kingdom against the onslaught of the Seleucid
Antiochus III, who had reconquered Parthia and advanced into Bactria in 209
B.C.' As a jewel strung on the east-west caravan routes, it is not surprising to find that Bactria, after covering her Seleucid flank, turned her
attention to Central Asia; military maneuvers in the following years "had a
double purpose--to deter the nomads by a display of force, and to ensure the
freedom of communication along the silk routes from China and the golden
road from Siberia."'
While the sources are unclear about dates and means, it is apparent that
the Bactrians also thrust south toward the sea. According to Strabo (quoting
Apollodorus):
Their chiefs ... conquered more nations than Alexander. These conquests
were achieved partly by Menander, partly by Demetrius, son of Euthydemus, king of the Bactrians. They got possession not only of Patalene

60. See WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 62; RAWLINSON, supra note 55, at 43.
61. WOODCOCK,supra note 51, at 65-66.
62. Id. at 66-68; RAWUlNSON, supra note 55, at 45-47.
63. WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 67-68, 66. See also RAWIJNSON, supra note 55, at 48-49,
52.
64. WOODCOCK,supra note 51, at 71 ("Euthyedemus threatened, he would order his eastern
frontiers to be opened to the Scythians, and he and Antiochus would founder together in the
nomad flood."); RAWUINSON, supra note 55, at 57-63.

65. WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 72.
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[on the Indus delta] but of the kingdom of Saraostus
[Saurashtra], and
6
Sigerdis, which constitute the remainder of the coast.

Woodcock argues that these conquests must have been made during the
180's, a time when Antiochus III had been defeated by the Romans in the
west. 7 The geo-political effect of this Bactrian advance was to separate the
Seleucids from their ally, the Mauryan Empire. Perhaps even more
importantly, it resulted in Bactrian control of the Indus delta." While
Woodcock suggests that (excepting Scylax and Alexander's navy) "no other
Greek travelled by sea either to or from the coasts of India until the final
decades of the second century B.C.,"' Strabo records two exploratory
voyages by Eudoxus to India, datable to circa 120-110 B.C.' This leaves
open the interesting possibility that the potential of a sea-route from India had
been recognized, and that another Bactrian aim could have been to gain this
further trading advantage, or at least to deny it to competitors. Toussaint
notes that some Seleucid subjects appear to have made voyages to India for
spices, but that they were generally deterred by piracy in the Persian Gulf,
while Agatharchides, writing before the voyages of Eudoxus, reported that
Indian merchants from Patala brought their cargoes to Aden and Mocha on
the Arabian peninsula where they were met by merchants and goods from
Egypt. 7 It is also ascertainably true that Hippolous' experience with the
monsoon winds resulted in a land-fall on the Indus delta after his departure
from the Arabian coast.'
Whatever the reason for Demetrius' "march to the sea," events soon
overtook Bactria and her Greeks. Despite the success of their thrust to the
sea, and of Menander's campaigns in northern India, dynastic turmoils took
a toll. The fragmentary "king lists" which have come down to us indicate
a kaleidoscopic succession involving at least three "royal houses," which
make the War of the Roses simplicity incarnate. At some periods multiple

66. Id. at 79-80; see also id. at 72 (noting that they "made a port at Berygaze (or Broach) on
the coast of Gujerat"); RAWLINSON, supra note 55, at 69 ("Their object, obviously, was to reach
the sea for trading purposes-the same object which led them to secure the high road into

China.").
67. WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 78 (which also notes: "Demetrius ...
then turned south
into Gedrosia, where he reached the Arabian Sea not far from the site of Karachi. Tam has put
forward a good case for the foundation of a second city in this region, Demetrias-in-Sind, on
the site of Alexander's Patala; if such a town was built, it would mean that Demetrius extended
his conquests at least as far as the western side of the Indus delta."); see also RAWUNSON, supra
note 55, at 69-70.
68. See WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 78-79.
69. Id. at 138; see also id. at 51 ("there are no records of any Greek captains having followed
the course of Scylax in reverse before the second century B.C.").
70. TOUSSAINT, supra note 54, at 33-34; CARY & WARMINGTON, supra note 54, at 70-71.
71. TOUSSAINT, supra note 54, at 32, 34; see also AGATHARCHIDES OF CNIDUS, ON THE
ERYTHRAEAN SEA 169, 169 n.3 (Stanley M. Burstein trans. 1989).
72. WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 141-42. See also TOUSSAINT, supra note 54, at 9; CARY
& WARMINGTON, supra note 54, at 75; Samuel P. Menefee, Pre-UNCLOS Marine Scientific
Research: An Introductory Survey of Law and Policy, 13 SEA CHANGES 37 (1991).
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claimants asserted authority; at other times, kings were deposed, only to
regroup their forces in the mountains and stage successful comebacks. 3
The Parthians, who had reasserted their independence, invaded Bactria's
western provinces about 160 B.C.74 The death blow to Bactria, however,
was struck by northern tribes who overthrew Greek authority in about 125
B.C., although Bactrian rule may have lingered a few years in the mountain
fastnesses.75 Obsessed in seeking the sea and the spoils of India, it is
apparent that the Bactrian Greeks neglected to put their house in order and
to bar the door to Asia. Now the thousand cities are no more; and Bactria
and its rulers are only a whisper on the winds of time. Ironically, many of
Bactria's problems have been inherited by a modem day landlocked successor-Afghanistan.7 6
"WALLED GARDENS": GEOGRAPHICAL DISADVANTAGE
IN THE DARK AND MIDDLE AGES

Like the medieval walled gardens of song and courtly story, communities
during the Dark and Middle Ages often turned inward, with a consequent
growth in landlocked and geographically disadvantaged entities. In the late
5th century A.D. four major kingdoms of Europe-those of the Burgudians,
the Alamanni, the Thuringians, and the Ostrogoths, were all landlocked.77
The next one hundred years, however, saw a growth in Frankish power, as
the Alamanni, part of the Thuringian territory, and all of Burgundy were
absorbed in turn.' The Ostrogoths, meanwhile, had reached the Adriatic
and expanded into Italy before being overwhelmed in turn by the Lombards.
This allowed the Eastern Roman Empire, controlled from Constantinople, to
regain ground in the west, so that it controlled much of the Adriatic, as well
as the Aegean and the eastern and southern Mediterranean (including the
former Kingdom of the Vandals). 9 After about 632 A.D., however, much
of the Byzantine territory in the Middle East and North Africa was in turn
overrun by the Arabs and Saracens, so that by 750 the Califate controlled the
shores of the entire southern Mediterranean.'

73. For general discussions of this period of Bactrian history, see WOODCOCK, supra note 51,
at 81-130; RAWLINSON, supra note 55, at 73-137.
74. This occurred under the rule of Mithridates I. See WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 90-93;
RAWLINSON, supra note 55, at 74-80.

75. See RAIWUNSON, supra note 55, at 88-113, 136-37; WOODCOCK, supra note 51, at 116-17,
126-28.
76. For more on this later landlocked state, see MARTIN IRA GLASSNER, ACCESS TO THE SEA

FOR DEVELOPING LAND-LOCKED STATES 39-83 (1970); R. GOPALAKRiSHNAN, THE GEOGRAPHY
AND POLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN (1980); ABDUL HAKIM TABIBI, FREE ACCESS TO THE SEA FOR
COUNTRIES WITHOUT SEA COAST; THE POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN ON THIS QUESTION (1958).

77.
78.
79.
80.

See
See
See
See

SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 50.
id. at 53.
id. at 52.
id. at 53.
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In the west, the Carolingian Empire was divided in three by the Treaty
of Verdun (843 A.D.). The East Frankish Kingdom of Louis, seriously
geographically disadvantaged, with only a small North Sea shoreline, must
have found outlets to the Baltic and Adriatic through its Slavic tributaries.
Although these states (including the landlocked Moravian Kingdom) were lost
from Frankish control by 888 A.D., the middle kingdom of Lothair, wedged
uncomfortably between the East Frankish state and the West Frankish
Kingdom of Charles, had been split between the two surviving rulers in 870
A.D., giving increased outlets to the sea in the north and south to the former
nation.81 While on one level, access was still preserved, the rise of feudal
divisions in France, Italy, and Germany led to the patchwork of territories
and sovereignties which continued to dominate these areas of Europe for
several centuries to come. In central Europe the Duchies of Upper Lorraine,
Upper Burgundy, Swabia, East and West Franconia, Thuringia, Bohemia,
and Bavaria were all landlocked!' Aragon was cut off from the sea in the
west, as were Poland and Hungary in the east.'
At the same time,
Glassner notes that "[als early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries,
territories in Europe, particularly Italy, began giving treaty rights to landlocked territories and began the internationalization of rivers, the first means
of assuring access to the sea for land-locked states."" The establishment
of Crusader states in the Holy Land during the twelfth century resulted not
only in the landlocked County of Edessa (first to be retaken by the Moslems), but in the Principality of Antioch, the County of Tripoli, and the
Kingdom of Jerusalem, which caused severe geographic disadvantage to the
landward Arab populations.'
During the late fourteenth century the
landlocked states of Eurasia included Navarre, Anjou, Poland, Wallachia, the
Dominions of Mohammed Artin and the state of the Turkomans, while
Castille, France, Hungary, and Lithuania were all seriously geographically
disadvantaged.' That the situation was even more complex is suggested by
a glance at the map of central Europe during this period. "Statelets" such
as the Bishopric of Trent, the Archbishopric of Salzburg, the Swiss
Confederation, the Bishopric of Basel, the Bishoprics of Sion and of Geneva,
Bescana, Wurtemberg, the Palatinate of the Rhine, the Burgraviate of
Nurenberg, Hesse, the County of Nassau, the Archbishopric of Treves, the
Duchy of Luxemberg, Bremen, and the Electorate of Saxony were landlocked
(and this does not come close to exhausting the list). When one throws in

81. See id. at 56.

82. See id. at 62-63 (showing map of A.D. 919-1125).
83. See id. at 66-67 (circa 1097).
84. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 18.
85. See SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 68. Similarly the Sultinate of Iconium had access to the
sea blocked by the Byzantine Empire and the Kingdom of Armenia, see id., while as late as the
13th century it still suffered disadvantage due to Armenia and the "Empires" of Nicaca and
Trebizond. See id. at 73.
86. See id. at 77.
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the question of geographical disadvantage, it is clear that one might research
for years in this single phase of history." In 15th century Italy at least six
states: the Marquisates of Saluzzo and of Montferrat, Asti, the Duchy of
Milan, the Marquisate of Montua, and the Republic of San Marino were
landlocked, while three others, Savoy, Modena, and Lucca were demonstrably geographically disadvantaged. 8" If generalization is possible here, it is
clear that the fission of empires long before those of Austria-Hungary and the
Soviet Union resulted in landlocked and geographically disadvantaged relicts.
Conversely, as shall be seen, such problems may have played a role in the
combination of entities and the eventual formation of nation-states.
CASE STUDY:

SAN MARINO, AN "ARK ON THE HILLTOP"

San Marino, allegedly the world's smallest republic," "has been
likened to the Ark stranded on the hilltop."' Traditionally founded by San
Marino or Marinus, a fourth century ecclesiastical refugee from the seaport
of Rimini (which lies some 14 miles to the northeast),91 San Marino's
presence can be traced at least as far back as 755 A.D., with a mention of
the "Castellum Sancti Marini."' Early on, it was a "canonical corporation,"' but subsequently evolved as a republic. In 1100 it purchased the
towns of Penna Rossa and Casole from the Count of Carpegna.' While
interdicted by the Pope in 1247-49 for joining the Ghibellines, the city state
successfully avoided other factional quarrels of the period.95 "The Republic
of San Marino is not redoubtable, nor to be feared. Such is the cause of its
long prosperity."' A fourteenth-century crisis occurred due initially to the
increasing influence of the Bishops of Montefeltro. When Bishop Benvenuto
was unsuccessful in his demand for payments from San Marino, he attempted
to sell his rights to a more forceful purchaser-Malatesta of Rimini.' This

87. See id. at 78-79 (for 1378). While the map had changed, the situation was substantially
similar in this area in 1477. See id. at 86-87.
88. See id. at 90.
89. San Marino, in 19 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 950 (1964).
90. VIRGINIA W. JOHNSON, Two QUAINT REPUBuCS: ANDORRA AND SAN MARINO 131
(1913).
91. Id. at 133-44; San Marino, supra note 89, at 950.
92. San Marino, supra note 89, at 950.
93. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 156 (referred to in early records as the "Community of the
Castle of San Marino").
94. Id. at 158-59.
95. San Marino, supra note 89, at 950; see also JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 165 (noting that

the Ghibellines and Guelphs were rival branches of the German houses of Bavaria and Suabia
"which resulted from the death of Barbarossa in 1190") id. at 175 notes a gain in population
from external refugees in these quarrels.
96. Messr. Barghou-Fortriou, quoted in JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 174.
97. Id. at 176; see also San Marino, supra note 89, at 950.
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claim was countenanced by the Pope and the city-state only saved itself by
resorting to legal remedies.
The Commonwealth employed a sagacious avocato. .. of Rimini to make
careful researches into early archives to prove that no allegiance to the
Holy See was obligatory, as the community had been accorded a treaty by
Pepin le Bref. Rimini turned aside, capriciously, to other matters, and San
Marino triumphed even to the extent of making an amicable compact with
the dangerous Malatesta for mutual protection.'
A subsequent attempt by another Bishop of Montefeltro-Peruzzi-for
control, also failed. "A judge of Rimini drew up a Privilegivwn for the
state, attesting rights to rule itself, pass sentence civil and criminal, and
acknowledge no jurisdiction of the Church."'
In the early fifteenth
century, the state is identified as "[tihe Castle of San Marino. .. elevated,
strong and inaccessible, with three hundred hearts and two forts.'"'10
Despite some peripheral dabbling in supranational politics,"'1 by the
fifteenth century, San Marino is described as being "poised in the scales
between Urbino and Rimini. The Dukes of Urbino were steadfast friends
and protectors of the tiny Republic, which served as a bulwark, in state
policy, between the two principalities and the restless violence and intrigues
of the Malatesta of Rimini." 1" Thus it appears that the republic was a
longstanding natural buffer; indeed the Dukes of Urbino were originally
members of the Montefeltro family," °e suggesting that San Marino's pivotal
position had been in place for well over a century. In the struggle between
Duke Federigo of Urbino and Sigismondo Malatesta of Rimini, San Marino
took the side of the former when Pope Pius II, to whom the republic had
appealed for protection, joined forces with Urbino. Rimini was vanquished,
and San Marino received as "spoils" the villages of Florentino, Serravalle,
Faetano, and the Castle of Montegiardino, °4 but refused to participate
further in regional politics. 3 5

98. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 176.

99. Id. at 177.
100. See id.
101. The city-state, for example, fought against Feltri at the siege of San Leo in support of
Papal power and was strongly influenced by Cardinal Albomoz of Toledo, the Papal

legate. See id. at 179-80.
102. Id. at 181-82; see also id. at 186; San Marino, supra note 89, at 950 ("Most of the
republic falls within the diocese of Montefeltro, a small portion within that of Rimini.").
103. See San Marino, supra note 89, at 950.
104. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 190; see also San Marino, supra note 89, at 950.
105. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 190. ("[O]ffers were subsequently made, by letter, to the
Captains to enlist in the service of the Pope, the King of Naples, the Lord of Fal, and Florence,
but military enterprise, other than as a means of self-protection, was refused.")
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In the sixteenth century, the republic was troubled by the machinations

of Cesare Borgia'" and later by Venice." °

Although the Pope himself

intervened, declaring San Marino under his protocol, Leo X considered
handing the state to his nephew as a fief.l" Surviving a surprise attack by
the Condottiere Piero Strozzi, 1 0 San Marino, despite internal disorders,

continued under the protection of the Dukes of Urbino." 0 Duke Francesco
Mario II, last of the house, ensured that San Marino remained independent

when the Duchy of Urbino was absorbed by the Papal States."'
In the eighteenth century, the major threats faced by the Republic were
the machinations of Cardinal Alberoni. This Papal Legate characterized San
Marino as "'a very Geneva in the heart of the Papal States, a hot-bed of
tyrants ....
if a hostile prince should seize it, he could make of it a strong
standpoint from which to attach the Pontifical domains.'"1'
In consequence, Alberoni
harassed the frontiers of San Marino, checked business transactions with
Ravenna [where he was Legate] and even had merchandise seized on the
roads by his bravos. He tapered with disaffected elements ... and bribed
some exiles to complain that they belonged within the jurisdiction of the
House of Loreto. He persuaded several traitors to betray their country by
"1 13
signing
an address to the Pope, requesting to be incorporated in the Roman
States.
These preliminary moves were followed by an actual invasion of the
Republic on October 17, 1739 by forces under Alberoni, but the seizure was
revoked by Clement XII in a treaty of amity the following year, and the
impetuous cardinal was deposed.114
Napoleon, fortunately for the Republic, appears to have viewed San
Marino as a model state and a natural "ally" of republican France.' 15 This
amity extended to succeeding French governments, providing a counter106. See id. at 194 ("the death of Alexander VI, and the illness of Cesar [sic] averted the
catastrophe," noting that Venice had been appealed to in vain for protection). But see San
Marino, supra note 89, at 950 ("It fell into the hands of Cesare Borgia in 1503 but soon
regained its freedom").
107. See JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 195 ("[Venice] took Rimini, and Pandolfo Malateste
endeavoured to corrupt San Marino in his jealousy of Venetian influence.").
108. Id. at 195-96.
109. In 1542. Id. at 196.
110. Id.; San Marino, supra note 89, at 950. Johnson notes that "[a] document exists in the
[Urbino] archives in which [Duke] Guidoboldo [II] promised to defend San Marino from
adversaries, at all times, as other members of his house had done." JOHNSON, supra, 197.
111. This was done by a treaty with Pope Clement VIII. The status of San Marino was
confirmed when the Duchy of Urbino reverted to the Holy See in 1631 under Pope Urban VIII.
See JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 198-99; San Marino, supra note 89, at 950.
112. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 200.
113. Id. at 201.
114. See id. at 201, 204; see also San Marino, supra note 89, at 950.
115. See JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 204-06 (noting that San Marina declined Napolean's offer
to enlarge its boundaries).
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weight to more local pressures. Charles X, for example, stated that French
protection would be given the Republic if necessary, while Chateaubriand,
although a French monarchist, staked his claim as a "San Marino republican." 11 San Marino served as (an unwilling) host to the defeated troops
of Garabaldi, incurring Austrian enmity, and also antagonized Pope Pius IX
by protecting republican fugitives from Rome.117 Both Napoleon III and

the House of Savoy supported the Republic, however, San Marino came

under the protection of the Kingdom of Italy in 1862." Although exporting cut stone and wine, much of the country's revenue is gained through the

sale of postage stamps and the granting of monopoly concessions to the
Italian state for the sale of tobacco, playing cards, and other items."' Coexistence with a benign neighbor thus mitigates the Republic's land-locked

status, which in any case does not appear to have hampered its selfsufficiency. Indeed such geographical factors may have contributed to the
continued existence of this state.
"MANIFEST DESTINIES": THE GROWTH OF NATION-STATES

The period from the 15th or 17th century on up to the present has seen
the foundation and development of modern nation-states."2 While there
116. Id. at 207-08.
117. Id. at 208-10.
118. Id. at 210-11; San Marino, supra note 89, at 950. With certain problems, this arrangement has remained in force up to the present. See id., which notes that "[i]n World War
II San Marino remained neutral, but suffered a severe bombing raid and other infringements of
its neutrality. The fascist regime was overthrown in 1943."
119. San Marino, supra note 89, at 950.
120. Opinions differ as to when this process, and the connected phenomenon of nationalism,
actually began. Barnes argues:
The older generation of histories ..
were wont to regard the origin of the modem
state system as the product of the so-called "Renaissance," or,. .. conventially dated
the emergence of nationality from the Protestant revolt and its resulting political
adjustments in the Peace of Augsburg [1555] and the Treaty of Westphalia [1648].
... [B]oth "Renaissance" and "Reformation," in their broadest aspects, were but
phases or results of that great transformation which marks the origin of the modem
world and the national-state system-the "Commercial Revolution." By this is meant
not only the discoveries, the revival of trade and the "intervention of capital" but also
the reactions of these innovations upon the whole basis of European civilization.
Harry Elmer Barnes, Nationalism, 19 THE ENCYCLOPEIDA AMERICANA 743d, at 748-49 (1954).
Barnes dates this from the voyages of Columbus and Vasco de Gama in the 1590's. Id. at 748.
But see Hans Kohn, Nationalism, 16 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 145, 146 (1964), who seems
to date its rise from the 18th century and who notes: "[t]he first full manifestation of modern
nationalism occurred in 17th-century England, in the Puritan revolution."
[N]ationalism arose as a dominant force in the 18th century in western Europe and
in North America; the American and the French revolutions may be regarded as its
first powerful manifestations. From the western world, after having penetrated the
new countries of Latin America, it spread in the early 19th century to central Europe,
thence, toward the middle of the century, to eastern and southeastern Europe, until,
at the beginning of the 20th century, it put its stamp on the ancient lands of Asia and
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were many factors behind the amalgamation of feudal regimes or other forms
of regional combination, one driving force was certainly the elimination of
geographical disadvantage or land-locked status. Often this process of fusion
stretches far back into the past, although if pursued to its end it occasionally
leads to a previous fissioned. Spain provides one such example. In 750
A.D., most of the Iberian peninsula was under the Califate except for part
of the Pyrenees and a northern coastal strip which formed Asturias. 21
Under Charlemagne the Franks retook all of the Spanish March and the
Kingdom of Asurias expanded, resulting in certain geographical disadvantage
for the Ommiad Emirate of Cordova." By 1000 A.D. the Navarre section
of the Spanish March had become a separate Kingdom; 3 by 1097 the
March had further fissured into Catalonia and landlocked Aragon.
Within a century, Leon and Castile, occupying the lands of Asturias, had
expanded inland at the expense of the Almohad moors; Portugal was
established on the Atlantic coast, and Aragon had enlarged to swallow
Catalonia and thereby gain access to the sea."
During the next three
hundred years, Portugal expanded south along the coast (causing a geographic disadvantage to Spain which still remains), Aragon did likewise along the
Mediterranean, while Naverre lost its coastline to Castile and Leon, and the
latter kingdom pushed the remaining Spanish moors into the Kingdom of
Granada in the peninsula's extreme south. The landlocked kingdoms of
Cordova and Jaen fell to Castile in 1236 and 1241 while their coastal
neighbors, the states of Seville and Murcia held out only marginally
longer."
Castile and Leon finally removed its last barrier to the south
where Granada fell in 1492;127 the year Columbus helped usher in the age
of discovery. Landlocked Naverre became part of Aragon in 1512,11 and
subsequently Aragon and Castile merged to create the nation-state of today.
Similar combinations can be traced for countries such as Italy, which
evolved from the Kingdom of Sardina. This state's initial expansions were
at the expense of landlocked neighbors-Lombardy in 1859, Parma in 1860
as well as geographically disadvantaged Modena, and then (better situated)
Tuscany, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the same
year. Venetia and Rome, both areas which caused geographic disadvantage

Africa.
Id. at 145-46.
121. See SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 53.
122. See id. at 54 (c. 814 A.D.)

123. See id. at 58.
124. See id. at 66.
125. See id. at 83, 82.
126. They fell in 1242 and 1253, respectively.

See id. at 83.

127. See id.
128. See id. at 118.
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to the new Italian state, were absorbed in 1866 and 1870.129 Other national
examples-such as the more complex pattern of Germany"1-could also be
cited.

Even such well-known history as the United States' own westward
expansion, with its theme of "manifest destiny," takes on new meaning when
viewed in terms of geographical disadvantage. Glassner notes that the 1795
treaty of San Lorenzo el Real, negotiated by Thomas Jefferson "gave
Americans the right to navigate the Mississippi River and other Spanish

rivers to the sea, conceding in fact if not in principle Jefferson's claim that
'the Ocean is free to all men, and their rivers to all their inhabitants. '""'

The 1803 Louisiana Purchase assured the new Republic of a coastline on the
Gulf of Mexico,"

while subsequent nibblings at Spanish Florida (in 1810,

1813, and finally resulting in the cession of 1819) removed any geographical
disadvantage in this region. 33 From then on the thrust was west, toward
the Pacific. The Oregon Territory, jointly occupied by the United States and
Great Britain from 1818, was finally divided between the powers in 1846.
It is perhaps significant that acquisition of the California frontage in 1848,

as a result of the Mexican War, was the last major continental addition to the
country-the United States was (arguably) no longer geographically
disadvantaged. 3" Not so fortunate is the plight of Russia; rather than
achieving her seaward goals in under a century, she has sought the sea for
over a millennium!
CASE STUDY:

RUSSIA,

A

NATION SEEKING THE SEA

Surely one of the longest and most persistent quests for the sea has been
Imperial Russia's search for her own warm water port. 35 The early
Kingdom of Hermanarich (375 A.D.) and Attila's Hunnic Empire (c. 450)

129. See id. at 161.
130. See id. at 86-87 (c. 1477), 114-15 (c. 1547), 122-23 (c. 1648), 134-35 (c. 1786), 154-55
(1812), 157 (1814, 1815), 158-59 (1815-66), 161 (1866-1919). To fully realize the complicated
nature of geographical disadvantage in this area, see hi. at 142-43, for an in-depth view of
territorial changes to the landlocked states of Baden and Wurtemberg.
131. GLASSNER, supra note 5, at 18.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 198-99. The only possible remaining areas of
geographical disadvantage are the southern tip of Vancouver Island and the lack of any frontage
on the Gulf of California. In the case of the latter it is interesting that at least one American
filibustering expedition was directed toward this area.
135. Mitchell, however, offers an interesting perspective on this quest, stating that "[a]part
from certain exceptional periods of maritime activity .. . the sea, as the ultimate objective,
remained with the Russians a dream rather than an element of substance which at all costs must
be reached and used as a means to progress. MAIRIN MITCHELL, THE MARITIME HISTORY OF
RUSSIA: 848-1948, 43 (1949). Further, "[w]hen she did reach the seas, it was unfortunate for
her that they were enclosed ones."
Id. (which goes on to list a series of geographic
disadvantages leaving no doubt as to why Russia desired a warm water port).
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both stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea."

R.J. Kerner makes the

case for the expansion from a central core area down various rivers to the
sea.
It was the Vladai Hills region ...
that the Scandinavian Varangians,
usually known as the Vikings, utilized in order to trade from the Baltic to
the Black and Caspian seas ...
. It was the nerve center of the first
Russian state based on Kiev and Novgorod, which never released its grip
on this portage system until the Kievan state went to pieces. It was this
region that held the key to the empire built up by Novgorod the Great after
the fall of Kiev. It controlled Novgorod's access to food in the south and
the southeast, and her fur empire to the north and northeast, without which
the empire could not exist. It was this region that Moscow wrested from
Novgorod late in the fifteenth century in its drive for markets and natural
resources. The acquisition at that time of the necessary part of this portage
region for a Baltic-Caspian trade route, and of the rest of it in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, made it possible for Moscow to dominate the
whole of the eastern European plain and to expand to the five seas:
westward to the Baltic, southward to the Black and the Caspian, northward
to the Arctic and eastward to the Pacific.'37

The fifteenth century saw the rise of Moscow, which had interests in both the
Baltic and Caspian trade. "It was this Baltic-Volga-Caspian trade route that
was to form the axis of the new Muscovite state. Landlocked Moscow's
future on the middle course of this route was either suffocation or domination
of the rivers and portages from sea to sea." 13 It was not until the reign

136. See SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 48, 50.
137. ROBERT J. KERNER, THE URGE TO THE SEA: THE COURSE OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 3-4

(1942). Kerner goes on to argue that the "mastery of eastern Europe" was gained by "domination of river systems and the control of portages between them by means of ostrogs (blockhouscs) or of fortified monasteries." Id. at 5. See also Paul Milyukov;, X. [the Editors], Russia
[V: History], in 19 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 691, 692 (1964) [hereinafter Russia], noting
the presence of Viking tumulii "in the very tableland where four chief waterways of Russia, the
Neva basin, Volga, Disieper and Dvina, converge and form outlets to the Baltic, the Caspian
and the Black seas and thus determine the direction of ancient trade routes." Kerner notes the
importance of the portages or voloki as territorial and state boundaries; as sources of dispute they
were often divided between the states involved. See KERNER, supra, at 15. It is important in
this context to view such "dragging paths" for the vessels as potential chokepoints to navigation,
and thus as having a bearing on geographically disadvantaged states. Novgorod, for example,
was dependent upon certain portages for their supply of bread. "[Tihe Novgorodians made it
a fundamental policy to dominate the above-mentioned portages or at least to secure free passage
for their traders and merchants over them and the trade routes leading from them. This was
historically the substance of their relations with other Russian principalities." Id. at 28. The
breakdown of the Kievan state in the thirteenth century resulted in a fission into some dozen
separate dukedoms which fought among themselves; it seems likely that some of these quarrels
may have had to do with trade and geographical disadvantage. See Russia, supra, at 693.
138. KERNER, supra note 137, at 33. See also id. at 41 ("Barred from the Caspian by Kazan
and from the Baltic by Novgorod, Moscow.. . was faced with the alternative of suffocation or
of forging her way out to both seas."). In 1417 (under Ivan III)
Moscow first starved Novgorod (by seizing Torzhok) and then with lightning strokes
subdued her.... A rising of the Novgorod population followed the cutting off of
grain supplies and completed the military victory. With one stroke Moscow won
access to the Baltic and White seas and the entire fur empire to the north and east.
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of Ivan the Terrible (1553-84), however, that Russia gained toeholds on the
Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov.'
That the importance of the Baltic to
Russia was recognized by other regional powers is shown in a 1617 address
by Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden:

Thus our position has made things more difficult for the Russians, in this,
that they have been cut off from the shores of the Baltic. Henceforth they
are forbidden entrance to the Baltic at any point, and cannot use it for their
ships for their own accommodations, either for war purposes or for trade,
without our special permission. . .. "
Indeed, this geographical disadvantage was not reversed by the Russians until
Peter the Great's Northern Coalition. 1 A push eastward which was to
have lasting implications for Russian geography, ended with fur traders
obtaining access to the Pacific in the mid-seventeenth century.14 2 Nonetheless, the bulk of Russian interest still seems to have been focused on the
Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas. Peter the Great (1682-1725), for example,
came to power largely as a result of Prince Vasily Golitsyn's failed
expeditions to the Crimea in 1687 and 1689. Peter made peace with the
Porte ten years later, and held the district around Azov from 1696-1711 and
a beachhead across the Caspian Sea (in present day Iran) from 1723.1"1
Empress Anna returned this in 1732, but regained Azov in 1739,'" while
a small stretch of coast on the opposite side of the Sea of Azov was added
during the reign of Elizabeth (1741-62)."
The most serious Black Sea
expansion took place during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762-96).
Catherine's plan was to drive the Turks from Europe, founding a series of
states in the Balkans and crowning her grandson (appropriately named
Constantine) as ruler of a new Greek empire based in Constantinople. Her
two Turkish Wars (1768-74 and 1789-91) brought her the Crimea and part
of the northern Black Sea shoreline, but no major breakthrough.'"
Alexander I clashed with Turkey in 1806-12, and gained Bessarabia, a
district bordering the Black Sea on the north.147 During the reign of
Nicholas I there was another war with Turkey (1827-29). This resulted in

Id. at 43.
139. See William H. Chamberlin, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [History and Foreign
Affairs], 27 THE ENCYCLOPEDiA AMERICANA 293t, 293u (1954) [hereinafter Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics]; SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 138-39.
140. KERNER, supra note 137, at 49.
141. See id. at 52-53; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, supra note 139, at 293w.
142. See KERNER, supra note 137, at 66-88.
143. See Russia, supra note 137, at 697; SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 138-39. See also
CHRIsTOs L. RoZAius & PETROS N. STAGOS, THE TURKISH STRAITS 17 (1987).

144. See SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 138-39.
145. See id.
146. See id.; Russia, supra note 137, at 697; see also ROZAKIS & STAGOS, supra note 143, at

19-22.

147. Russia, supra note 137, at 698; see also ROZAKIS & STAGOS, supra note 143, at 23.
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the liberation of Greece, increased freedom for the Danubian principalities
and the opening of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea by the Treaty of
In 1844 and again in 1852, Nicholas urged a partition of
Adrianople. t
Turkey with the Balkan States to be autonomous under Russian suzerainty
and Constantinople to be a free city.149 European countries, however, did
not accept the bait. Indeed, the Crimean War (1854-56) forced Russia to
cede that part of Bessarabia nearest the Black Sea to the Danubian
principalities. 1" In 1876 Russia hoped to benefit from Balkan revolts
against the Turks, but Austria and England conditioned their neutrality on
Russia's promise not to attack Constantinople and to strictly limit her
territorial acquisitions. The major fruit of Russian victory was the return of
the ceded portion of Bessarabia. 151 In 1908 there was again talk of Turkish
partition between Austria and Russia, with the straits to be in the Russian
zone and Bulgaria under Russian influence. 52 During World War I Russia
conquered Trebizond, on the southern coast of the Black Sea, and proposed
partitions of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and 1916 would also have given
Russia control of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. 153 The Communist
Revolution, however, intervened and the new Soviet state relinquished all its
southern gains since 1877.11 In 1940 Stalin again turned Russian interest
toward the south. Rumania was forced to cede Bessarabia, and Russia
attempted (unsuccessfully) to gain holdings in the Balkans and the Black Sea
straits from Nazi Germany during World War II.151 In 1945 the Russians
applied pressure directly on Turkey for a return of Kars and Ardaham and
for joint USSR-Turkish defense of the straits."
This was successfully
rejected by Turkey, with Western support, and a Soviet note of 1953
announced that "the Soviet Union had no territorial claims whatsoever on
Turkey."' 57 Is Russia's "search for a warm water port" over? Some
pundits saw events in Afghanistan as merely the prelude to the undermining
of Pakistan and eventual Soviet penetration to the Indian Ocean. Even since
the breakup of the Soviet Union, the squabbles between Russia and the
148. Id. at 699.
149. A.A. Adnan & Geoffrey L. Lewis, Turkey [History], 22 ENCLYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA

590, 61-02 (1964) [hereinafter Turkey].
150. Russia, supra note 137, at 702; se also SHEPARD, supra note 33, at 164; Turkey, supra
note 149, at 602.
151. Russia, supra note 137, at 702; see also Turkey, supra note 149, at 603.
152. Turkey, supra note 149, at 604.
153. See id., 606; SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 168; ROZAKIs & STAGOS, supra note 143, at
26.
154. Turkey, supra note 149, at 606; see also ROZAKIS & STAGOS, supra note 143, at 26
(noting that "[t]he Soviet Union expressing abandoned all claims to territorial expansion in the
area of the straits" by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk).
155. Russia [World War II], supra note 137, at 719; ROZAKIS & STAGOS, supra note 143, at
43-44.
156. See Russia [World War II], supra note 155, at 721; ROZAIUS & STAGOS, supra note 143,
at 48; Turkey, supra note 149, at 611.
157. See RoZAKis & STAGOS, supra note 143, at 48-49; Turkey, supra note 149, at 611-12.
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Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet might be viewed by alarmists as indications
of continuing interest....
"SICK MEN OF EUROPE":

COLONIALISM AND ITS BREAKUP

Colonialism, which followed in the wake of maritime exploration was
driven by trade. The Venetians, the Portuguese, the Spanish, English, and
French all depended on the sea to connect their factories, forts, and

settlements, with the mother country; by definition, therefore, their initial
outposts caused geographical disadvantage to the natives and kingdoms of the
areas so developed. 158 Later, as control over various areas was consolidated and the riches and resources of continental interiors opened up, it is
arguable that political units which were formerly landlocked or disadvantaged

geographically may have gained increased access to the sea with their
increased access to or incorporation into colonial structures. In Africa, for
example, as colonial divisions replaced indigenous regimes, many natural

patterns of trade and commerce were disrupted. Thus it was that peoples
such as the Tuareg found themselves owing allegiance to different states

(Niger and Mali),' 59 that (at least for a time) the products of (pre-Zimbabwe) Rhodesia were transported to the sea through South African territory
rather than by the shorter Mozambique route, and that European combinations of diverse tribes into unified entities led to instability, and occasionally
158. This is not to suggest that pre-colonial geographical disadvantage did not feature in many

of these areas. See, for example, the description of the Foutha Yalloo in West Africa c. 1826,
as given in the account of slaver Theophilus Conneau:

This privilege [heading a caravan to the seaboard] is only granted as a great favor by
the Ali-Mamy to his favorite sons and immediate relations, on condition that half of
the products of this lucrative office shall be paid to him. The privileged son or
relation departs ... at the first beginning of the dry season with full power of life

and death, and squats himself and his party in one of the most frequented paths to the
seaside, often sending small squads . .. to the different paths and blockading all
passages to the beach. This blockade is sometimes kept up for a month or more....
[Tihe object ... is.. . not only to collect a large caravan and give the Chief himself

the more importance, but to sequester a certain tribute due to the Ali-Mamy by small
tribes....

Traders resort to all manner of subterfuge to evade these roads' interceptions, as
it . . . is often the case that the intention of their purpose is totally frustrated. When
seized by one of these blockading Chiefs, they are made to go to a town or factory
they perhaps never intended to visit, and when such a seizure lasts any time, it causes
them to expend all their provisions, diminishing their profits and capital.
CAPT. THEOPHILUS CONNEAU, A SLAVER'S LOG BOOK OR 20 YEARS' RESIDENCE IN AFRICA 66
(1976). See also id. at 99 ("Small traders frequent those rivers to escape the blockades of the
Foulah Chiefs."); id. at 127 (noting at least one instance of a Mandingo chief expecting "a
heavy duty for ... passage through his territory" to the interior).
159. CULTURAL ATLAS OF AFRICA 151, 153 (Jocelyn Murray, ed. 1981). Other examples
include the Sotho (Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa), id. at 206, 212, and the Ndebele
(Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa), id. at 196, 206. The Ewe tribe indeed was split
between different Great Powers (Britain and France) and today is found resident in two separate
countries, Ghana and Togo. See id. at 145.
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armed conflict."W At the same time, the development of road and rail
systems within the colonies of a single power enhanced transportation capacities and in part offset dislocations. Additionally, the occasionally friendly
relationships of the colonial powers allowed for the resolution of landlocked
problems which might otherwise have proved insoluble. One particularly
noteworthy solution was the granting of a narrow corridor to the sea (or a
navigable river) to a state which would otherwise have been thoroughly
landlocked. This occurred on several occasions in Africa in the late 19th
century, with one obvious surviving example being Zaire's exit to the
Atlantic.161 Finally, many landlocked states were destroyed in the colonial
scramble-two ironic examples being the Boer South African Republic and
the Orange Free State. 62
Decline, when it set in, often alleviated the problems of geographically
disadvantaged states which survived. Thus the loss of Venice's colonies
eventually resulted in the opening up of the related littoral."
Where
deeper penetration of land masses had occurred, however, the breakup of
colonial systems might cause as many problems as it solved. One prime 19th
century example-Bolivia-will be discussed below. Even in the present
century, however, many landlocked states suffer from a post-colonial legacy.
CASE STUDY:

BOLIVIA'S SEARCH FOR THE SEA

A prime example of the problem of landlocked states is Bolivia's search
for an outlet to the Pacific, a quest with nineteenth century roots and
contemporary ramifications. Created out of unorganized territory in 1825
when Spain's American Empire crumbled, Bolivia served as a buffer state
between Argentina, Chile, and Peru." Popularly described as "a beggar
sitting on a throne of gold," Bolivia has never been able to fulfill the promise
of its natural resources. '1 Initially, the country was able to claim part of
the Atacama Desert as well as the Pacific coast part of Cobija.'1 In the
1830's, Bolivia entered into a Confederation with North and South Peru,
effectively expanding its seacoast, but a threatened Chile successfully
attacked these allies and the Confederation was dissolved in 1839.167 At
about this time, the guano deposits of the Atacama Desert were being
160. One prime example of this was the Nigerian Civil War of the late 1960's. See Samuel
P. Menefee, Any Port in a Storm: The Worldwide Threat to Port Security, in PORTS IN PERIL
(Eric Ellen, ed., forthcoming) for a discussion of this conflict's effect on local ports.
161. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 19.
162. See MURRAY, supra note 159, at 59.
163. See SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 90, 104, 118-19, 124, 157.
164. George McCutchen McBride, et al., Bolivia [IV. History], in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 880 (1964) [hereinafter Bolivia].

165. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 88.
166. Id. at 96.
167. Id., see also Victor Andrade, Bolivia, 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 183, 189
(1954); Bolivia, supra note 164, at 880-81.
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increasingly sought in European markets as a rich fertilizer.'" In 1842,
a Chilean claim that its northern boundary extended to 23'S produced the
first definite overlap with Bolivia's claim (a southern boundary of 25 S).'"
For the next quarter century, the two countries quarreled over the southern
Atacama, until the treaty of 1866 set a common boundary at 24"S and
provided for joint exploitation of the nitrate resources."m During the next
ten years, Chile shouldered the task of developing the Atacama, but Bolivia
for a number of reasons was unable to effectively invest its capital or
citizenry in the effort. By the mid-1870's therefore, 93-95% of the
population of Bolivia's littoral were Chilean nationals."'
Resulting
economic and political rivalries led to a Secret Treaty of mutual protection
between Peru and Bolivia in 1873.172 Six years later, Chile sent troops to
protect her nationals and their business; these forces occupied several
Bolivian ports.' " Bolivia declared war on Chile, and the Peruvians offered
to mediate, perhaps in an attempt to gain time. After calmly overrunning all
Bolivian territory west of the Andes, Chile declared war on both Bolivia and
Peru, using the now not-so-Secret Treaty as a pretext. 74 This War of the
Pacific " lasted until 1883 when Peru, with its capitol occupied, signed the
Treaty of Anc6n, ceding the province of Tarapaca to Chile, and allowing the
future of two more northerly provinces (Tacna and Arica) to be determined
by plebiscite. 76 In 1884, Bolivia signed its own provisional Pact of Truce,
allowing Chile's continued occupation of the Bolivian littoral, but free transit
of Bolivian goods through the port of Antofagasta."v Bolivia was now
landlocked!
At this point the situation begins to become complicated.
On May 18, 1895, a treaty was signed at Santiago between Chile and
Bolivia "with a view to strengthening the bonds of friendship which unite

168. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 96-97.
169. See id. at 97.
170. Id., see also Bolivia, supra note 164, at 881.
171. GiASSNER, supra note 6, at 97-98.
172. Id. at 98; see also Bolivia, supra note 164, at 881 (noting that "the ostensible object" of
the treaty "was the preservation of their territorial integrity and their mutual defense against
exterior aggression. There can be no doubt that the aggression contemplated as possible by both
countries was a further encroachment on the part of Chile.").
173. Including Antofagasta, Tocopilla and Cobija. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 98. This
was in response to a Bolivian threat to tax nitrate exports and to seize those for which the tax
was not paid. See Bolivia, supra note 164, at 881.
174. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 98. This is discussed at greater length in Bolivia, supra
note 164, at 881.
175. Alternatively known as the "Nitrate War." See Andrade, supra note 167, at 189.
176. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 98; Bolivia, supra note 164, at 881.
177. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 98-99; Martin I. Glassner, The Transit Problems of
Landlocked States: The Cases of Bolivia and Paraguay in OCEAN YEARBOOK 4, 366, 372
(Elisabeth M. Burgese & Norton Ginsburg, eds. 1983).
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the two countries" and "in accord with the higher necessity that the future
development and commercial prosperity of Bolivia require her free access
to the sea." By this treaty Chile declared that if, in consequence of the
plebiscite (to take place under the treaty of Anc6n with Peru) or by virtue
of direct arrangement, it should "acquire dominion and permanent
sovereignty over the territories of Tacna and Arica, she undertakes to

transfer them to Bolivia in the same form and to the same extent as she

may acquire them"; the republic of Bolivia ayin as an indemnity for that
transfer $5,000,000 silver. If this cession should be effected, Chile should

advance its own frontier north of Camerones to Vitor, from the sea up to
the frontier which actually separates that district from Bolivia. Chile also

ledged itself to use its utmost endeavor, either separately or jointly with
olivia, to obtain possession of Tacna and Arica. If it failed, it bound
itself to cede to Bolivia the roadstead (caleta) of Vitor, or another
analogous one, and $5,000,000 silver. Supplementary protocols to this
treaty stipulated that the port to be ceded must "fully satisfy the present
and future requirements" of the commerce of Bolivia."s

So far so good. Unfortunately, Chile discovered that Bolivia had been
secretly negotiating with Argentina, a state with whom Chile had another
border dispute. Any chance of Bolivian-Chilean cooperation vanished, and
worse, Chile and Argentina compromised their differences, depriving Bolivia
of any hope of help from that quarter. 1" As a result, Bolivia was forced
to settle as best as it could.
In 1904, Bolivia signed a formal Treaty of Peace Friendship and
Commerce with Chile. In return for permanent possession of Bolivia's
Pacific coast, Chile was to grant to Bolivia in perpetuity "the broadest and
freest right of commercial transit through her territory and ports of the
Pacific," build a railway for Bolivian cargos to the coast, and allow Bolivia
to maintain customs agents in certain Chilean ports."s Dissatisfaction in
Bolivia with the treaty brought diplomatically-initiated attempts to change the
terms in 1910 and 1919.181 In 1921, the country approached the First
Assembly of the League of Nations, requesting a revision of all treaties
resulting from the War of the Pacific. This question was referred to a
Commission of Jurists, who reported that the demand was inadmissible as
only the signatory states, not the League, had the power to modify a
treaty." 8 An exchange of notes with Chile in 1923 and an attempt to
publicize the problem at the International Law Conference in 1925 both met

178. Bolivia, supra note 164, at 881-82.
179. Id. at 882.
180. The ports included Arica and Antofagasta. Disputes arising under the treaty were to be
referred to the Emperor of Germany. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 99. See also Glassner, supra
note 177, at 372, 374. Andrade, supra note 167, at 189 gives the date of the treaty's signing
as 195.
181. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 99, 101. Internally, Bolivian agitation over this issue was
allegedly responsible for the resignation of President Guerra (who favored repproachment with
Chile) after popular demonstrations against him. See Bolivia, supra note 164, at 882.
182. See Glassner, supra note 177, at 374-75; GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 101.
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with failure."
In the latter year too, an attempt by Chile and Peru to
(finally) hold the plebiscite called for in the Treaty of Ancon foundered, but
after arbitration by the United States, the Treaty of Santiago was signed
between the two parties in 1929." This split the provinces in question,
returning Tacna to Peru, while Chile retained Arica. Peru was also given
rights to a wharf, customs house, and railway station on Arica Bay. The
Complimentary Protocol to the Treaty stipulated that Peru was to have
absolutely free transit at Arica, and that neither party could cede to a third
party any part of the territories they received under the Treaty.' m
A 1942 initiative at the Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers
of the American Republics and a 1945 speech in which Bolivia's President
referred to his country's "permanent and inalienable right to aspire to her
own port on the Pacific" raised the problem anew. Chile stood by the Treaty
of 1904, but agreed to consider other concessions."
Bolivia on her part
unsuccessfully raised the issue at both the San Francisco Conference
establishing the United Nations (1945) and the Bogota Conference of 1948
which founded the Organization of American States (OAS)." s In 1950,
success seemed in hand when Bolivia and Chile exchanged notes agreeing to
a conference "to seek the formula which could make it possible to give to
Bolivia her own sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and to obtain for Chile
compensations that would not have territorial character and which effectively
take into account her interests." The conference, however, was never held.
When President Truman revealed that the "compensation" might consist of
water from Lakes Titicaca and Poopo for irrigation purposes, Peru ended the
discussion by invoking the Protocol to the Treaty of Santiago."'
In 1962, at the 17th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Bolivia
again unsuccessfully raised the issue of its access to the coast." 8 (This was
the Assembly session, however, that set in motion consideration of the
general question of transit rights for landlocked states.)"g The dispute
during this period was embittered by Chile's diversion of the Lauca River for
an irrigation project, and ultimately resulted in Bolivia's withdrawal from the
OAS. 9 In addition to Bolivia's "Day of the Sea" (March 23), a historical
celebration used as the annual zenith of the country's campaign against its

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 101; Glassner, supra note 177, at 375.
GtASSNER, supra note 6, at 102.
Id.
See id. at 103; Glassner, supra note 154, at 375.
GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 103; Glassner, supra note 177, at 375.
GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 103-04.

189. Id. at 105-06. The Bolivian Foreign Minister claimed during debate that "'Bolivia is the
only country in the world that was deprived of its coastline . . .because of an unjust war. In
each Bolivian, without exception, there is an unshakable desire to return to the sea.'" Id. at
105.
190. Id. at 106.
191. Id. at 104-06.
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landlocked status, 9 2 Bolivia has resorted to "Salida al Mar" ("Outlet to the
Sea") postmarks-Chile returned the offending letters or blotted out the
slogan-and the chalking of anti-Chilean graffiti on boxcars being returned
to that country.'
Diplomatic representatives of both countries made
broadcasts concerning the problem.

In a New York limes interview, the

Bolivian foreign minister suggested the ceding to Bolivia of an enclave
around the port of Mejillones rather than the creation of a formal corridor
and offered diversion of five small rivers to Chile for irrigation purposes." In the mid-1970's Bolivia again appeared close to success. In the
Charana Declaration of 1975, Bolivia and Chile resumed diplomatic
relations, broken in 1962, and agreed to work for solutions to mutual
problems, including Bolivia's opening to the sea.", Bolivia subsequently
proposed the cession of a corridor between Arica and Chile's border with
Peru (including the Arica-La Paz railroad) and another coastal area near
Pisagua, Iquique, or Antofagasta. Chile responded with a proposal to cede
a demilitarized northern corridor (but not the railroad) in return for an
equivalent amount of Bolivian territory and the exclusive use of the Rio
Lauca waters. Bolivia agreed, and Chile then consulted Peru as required
under the terms of the Complimentary Protocol to the Treaty of Santiago.
Peru responded with its own counterproposal-cession of a corridor to
Bolivia which would stretch only as far as the Pan American highway. The
remaining area between the highway and the sea (along with Arica) would
become an international zone under tri-partite administration, but Bolivia
would be allowed to build a sovereign port within this area. Chile rejected
the Peruvian idea and efforts to revive the negotiation failed.'
Today
slightly over a century after signing its provisional Pact of Truce with Chile,
Bolivia still remains landlocked.
WORLD WAR

I's

AFTERMATH AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

Of equal importance to the growth and decline of colonial empires in its
ramifications for landlocked and geographically disadvantaged areas was the
shifting balance of power between the major European states. One early
example of this was the Final Act of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, following
the collapse of Napoleon's Empire. Many of the treaty provisions, although
framed in terms of river navigability, directly related to problems of
geographical disadvantage. Thus the question of navigation on the Meuse
was of interest not only to the augmented Kingdom of the Netherlands, but
also to France while articles on the Rhine potentially affected the landlocked

192. Id. at 108.
193. Id. at 107-08.
194. Id. at 110 (This took place on October 4, 1963).

195. Glassner, supra note 177, at 377.
196. Id. at 377-78.
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states of Switzerland, Baden and Hessen, as well as a geographically
disadvantaged segment of Prussia. 1"
The most obvious example of the effect of Europolitics on this problem,
however, is the aftermath of World War I. From the ashes of this "war to

end all wars," it was hoped, would arise a reconstituted, fairer Europe. In
this new order, problems of geographic disadvantage would be minimized.
In a message of January 22, 1917 to the United States Senate, President
Wilson "declared that all States, especially countries with no access to the

sea, should be provided with the means of communicating freely with the
seashore towards which they appear to have a natural outlet." 1 Indeed
two of the President's Fourteen Points specifically guaranteed free and secure
access to the sea for Serbia (Point 11) and Poland (Point 13)."9 Switzerland apparently felt the time was opportune to request recognition of their
right to a flag. In a memorandum communicated to the President of the
Paris Peace Conference, they noted:
Although the right of flying the national flag as an emblem of sovereignty
must be considered as a part of the fundamental rights of every independent State, the Swiss Confederation would attach great value to formal
recognition of this right by the Powers, all the more so since Switzerland,
inspite of her land-locked situation inthe heart of the continent, has a
considerable share in the world's commerce. At the present time, when
the Powers are about to place all international relations on the basis of
Right, the Swiss Government feels particularly justified in expressing this
wish2W0for an international confirmation of their unquestionable rights

197. See SHEPHERD, supra note 33, at 157; GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 18 (noting: "Of
particular concern at that time were the Scheldt, the Meuse and the Rhine.").
198. See also GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 18.
199. See GiAsSNER, supra note 6, at 19; The Fourteen Points, 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
670, 671 (1964) ("Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea" and "An independent
Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably
Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea"). Glassner goes
on to note that while Serbia gained its seacoast through incorporation into Yugoslavia,
Poland became the beneficiary of a relatively new concept, the actual annexation of
territory intervening between an inland state and the sea. Such a corridor to the sea
would, supposedly, provide greater security for the land-locked state because any
attempt to interfere with commerce there by another state would be a violation of
natural sovereignty and thus more serious than a violation of freedom of transit.
Corridors became fashionable during the territorial reorganizations following the First
World War, with Finland, Iraq, Trasjordan, Palestine and Colombia receiving very
short shorelines on the open sea or a navigable river. The scramble for African land
produced similar corridors in the late nineteenth century, but the most important-and

contentious-was undoubtedly the Polish Corridor.
GLASsNER, supra, at 19.
200. "Memorandum on the Claim of Switzerland to a Maritime Flag Communicated to the

President of the Paris Peace Conference (1919)."

U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.5/L.1, Appendix

I [hereinafter "Memorandum on the Claim of Switzerland"].
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"[U]nrestricted navigation upon the open sea," argued the Swiss, was a right
possessed by every state?" As a flag "is the symbol of a State's sovereignty over the ship" its recognition by others is "an international duty,
resulting from the fundamental right of respect to which every State may lay
claim. " ' "[Tihe right of inland countries to navigating remained, on
principle, undisputed and whenever objections were raised, it was generally
not a question of right but of practical difficulties which opposed themselves
to the exercise of this right on the part of States, that are deprived of any
access to the sea."'
To exclude landlocked countries from this right
would be to violate "the principle of equality of States . .." and would be
inconsistent with equity and international right.'0
Finally, Switzerland
noted, there were economic arguments in support of her claim.
The desire of Switzerland to create a commercial fleet of her own,
enjoying the same rights and being subject to the same duties as the fleets
of other countries, is not dictated by reasons of international policy, as
might be the case with a larger country, nor by the aspiration of making
her navigation subservient to the purpose of economic conquest or colonial
expansion. Undoubtedly Switzerland feels the inconvenience of being
entirely dependent on foreign maritime trade for the transmission of her
correspondence and. for her intercourse with her representatives abroad.
Nevertheless, when she sustains her claim to an ocean traffic under her
own flag, she is mainly prompted by the needs of her economic life.
These needs are the result of the special character of the Swiss industry,
which by reason of the smallness of the inland market and of the scarcity
of the raw materials is entirely dependent on importation and exportation;
moreover, the existence of a comparatively dense population, which entails
the necessity of revictualing the country from beyond the sea.2'5

This memorandum, a remarkable brief for access to the sea, closed by noting
that "[t]he Swiss Government would be highly gratified if in stating these
facts they had succeeded in convincing the Powers of the legitimacy of their
claim as well as of the necessity for Switzerland to possess a recognized
maritime navigation.""

201. Id. Rather ironically, according to Colombos,
Before the war of 1914-18, there was some doubt as to whether a State without a

seaboard could claim the right to a maritime flag. The question was raised in
Switzerland several times, but on each occasion the Swiss Federal Council declined
to give permission to Swiss subjects to use the national flag at sea. They were consequently compelled to use the flag of some other State.
C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 293-94 (6th ed. 1967); see also 1
PAUL FAUCHILLE, TRAITt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, 904 (1925).

202. "Memorandum on the Claim of Switzerland," supra note 200.
203. Id.

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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That Switzerland's appeal received attention in the Treaty of Versailles
is suggested by Article 273, which reads in pertinent part:
[R]ecognition shall be accorded to the certificates and documents issued
to their vessels by the Governments of new States, whether they have a
sea-coast or not, provided that such certificates and documents shall be
issued in conformity with the general practice observed in the principal
maritime States.
The High Contracting Parties agree to recognise the flag flown by the
vessels of an Allied or Associated Power having no sea-coast which are
registered at some one specified place situated in its territory; such place
shall serve as the port of registry of such vessels.'

Certainly the Treaty's internationalization of several European rivers" and
its concern with freedom of transit issuesw suggests an awareness of the
problems faced by landlocked and geographically disadvantaged entities.
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE BARCELONA CoNvENTIoNs,
AND THEIR AFTERMATH

The concept of free transit was enshrined in the Covenant of the League
of Nations. Article 23 notes that:
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:
(e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of
communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce
of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities
of the regions
devastated during the war of 1914 to 1918 shall be borne in
mind. °

207. Treaty of Versailles, Versailles, June 28, 1919, 2 BEvANs 43 (emphasis added).
208. These included:
"
*
*
*
*

the
the
the
the
the

Elbe [Label from its confluence with the Vltava [Moldau]
Vlatva [Moldau] (from Prague)
Oder [Odre] (from its confluence with the Oppa)
Nieman [Russtron-Memel-Nieman] (from Grodno)
Danube (from Ulm)

See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 207, art. 331. See also id., arts. 332, 338 (the latter stating
that the regime of arts. 332-37 would be superseded by provisions of a General Convention to
be drawn up).
209. See id., arts. 321-24. Again, a Convention on the subject was visualized. See id., art.
379; 9 MARJORIE M. WmITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1143 (1968).
210. Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 23, reprinted in SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS TO THE SEA OF LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES, Jan. 14, 1958,
Doc. A/CONF. 13/29 at 117 [hereinafter QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS].
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This article is of interest in having what might be considered to be one of the
earliest formal references to geographical disadvantage, in the form of
devastation from the war.211 More importantly, however, Article 23 is
considered a milestone in the development of multilateral support for freedom
of transit; "[t]he development . . resulting from this provision has been
described in a great many works... "2"1 To fulfill the provisions of
23(e), the Council of the League resolved on May 19, 1920 to invite
members to attend a General Conference, which would also consider
"conventions on the regime of ports, waterways and railways referred to in
articles 338 and 379 of the Treaty of Versailles.""'
A Commission of Enquiry on Freedom of Communications and Transit
was established under the resolution, and eventually submitted six documents
to the General Conference:
*
*
*
•
*
*

A draft convention on the right to a flag of States not possessing
a sea coast.
A draft convention on freedom of transit.
A draft convention on the international regime of navigable
waterways.
A draft convention on the international regime of railways.
A resolution relating to an international rdgime for ports.
A general scheme to organize a General Communications and
Transit Conference and a Permanent Communications and Transit
Committee. 1 4

The first three of these found expression in the form of a declaration and two
conventions (and accompanying statutes) covering these topics. While a
convention had been suggested on the subject of the right of states not
possessing a seacoast to nonetheless have their own flag vessels, the British
delegate suggested that legal problems might result from this process. "'It
may be claimed that the right to a flag cannot be granted in a Convention
which is open to denunciation. Legal difficulties might ensue. The vessels
flying the flag of Switzerland, for example, might be considered as
pirates.'" 2"
This was overcome by recasting the draft convention's
principle as a "Declaration," as follows:

211. While this criterion does not exactly match any of those given by Alexander, see supra
text at notes 30-31, it is similar to "(7) Status as 'least developed state.'"
212. QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 118. According to Povolny, "[blefore
World War I there was little positive international law concerning the transit rights of transit of
goods across the states party to it was the Universal Postal Union created by the Berne Postal
Congress on 9 October 1874." Povolny, supra note 8, at 2.
213. QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 119.
214. Id. at 122. This last scheme was in response to a League proposal "to organize a
Permanent Communications Committee to consider and propose 'measures calculated to assure
freedom of communications and transit at all times...'" Id. at 119.

215. Id. at 157.
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The undersigned, duly authorised for the purpose, declare that the States
which they represent recognise the flag flown by the vessels of any State
having no sea-coast which are registered at some one specified place

situated in its216territory; such place shall serve as the port of registry of
such vessels.

The text of the Declaration, as has been pointed out, resembles that of the
relevant article of the Treaty of Versailles. 1 7 The Convention and Statute
on Freedom of Transit,2 1 essentially codified the existing practices of
bilateraltreaties in a multilateral context. 21 9
The convention recognized the right of landlocked countries to transit their
coastal neighbors with equality of treatment. This meant that the inland
states had the right to have the same facilities for access to the sea as if the
journey had taken place in the territory of a single state. Thus the transit
state was obliged to assist the movement of goods across its territories, to
levy no 2discriminatory tolls or taxes, and to fix only reasonable freight
charges. 2'
While equality of freedom of transit was recognized, the interpretation of this
concept was restricted, the general reason for this being the desire to reserve
benefits to those who ratified or acceded to the convention, and had thus
Furthermore, the right of free transit was not
assumed its obligations."
absolute,' 2 not overriding the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals
in time of war,' 2 not applying to passengers or goods excluded for reasons
of health or public security,' and not affecting provisions of conventions
"relating to the transit, export or import of particular kinds of articles"'
". or in pursuance of general Conventions intended to prevent any
infringement of industrial, literary or artistic property, or relating to false
marks, false indications of origin, or other methods of unfair competition."'
While article 13 of the Statute provided for the settlement of dis-

216. Declaration recognising the Right to a Flag of States having no Sea-coast, Barcelona, April
20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 73, at 74.
217. See QUESnON OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 208, at 156; supra note 207 and accompany-

ing text.
218. Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit, Barcelona, April 20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S.
11.
219. See Povolny, supra note 8, at 3.
220. Id.
221. See QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 135; see also id., at 132.

222. See Povolny, supra note 8, at 3.
223. See Statute on Freedom of Transit, supra note 218, art. 8.
224. See id., art. 5.
225. Including opium, dangerous drugs, arms, or the "produce of fisheries." Id.
226. Id. Additionally, article 12 of the Statute continued the special treatment accorded states
damaged during World War I, allowing them "to be relieved temporarily of the obligations
[of any provision of the Statute], it being understood that the
arising from the application ...
principle of freedom of transit must be observed to the utmost possible extent." Id., art. 12.
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putes, 2z 7 it should be noted that the Convention and Statute were products
of a divided international community, not only split between those who
favored liberal and restrictive treatment toward non-signatories, 2 but

fractured along regional lines.'
The Convention and Statute on the Rdgime of Navigable Waterways of
International Concern ° and an Additional Protocol"2 ' on the same subject also resulted from the Barcelona meeting. The former was viewed as a
"Revised Act of Vienna," 2 and required equality of treatment by states

parties on "navigable waterways of international concern"

3

to the extent

that:

*
*
*

no dues (except those intended to cover actual expenditures for
maintenance and improvements) might be levied along the course
of or at the mouth of such waterway
persons and goods in transit would be exempted from customs
formalities
users of contracting States would be given treatment equal to that
of nationals of the riparian State in the use of ports, port installations, etc.'

227. See id., art. 13; QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 137-40.
228. See QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 182.
229. See id. at 146, which notes "that most of the Latin American representatives . . . 'took
pains to point out that the drafts submitted to them were too exclusively European in character
and did not take sufficient account of the special position, in fact and in law, of the States of the
New World.'"
230. Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern,
Barcelona, April 20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 35.
231. Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of
International Concern, Barcelona, April 20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 65.
232. See supra note 197 and accompanying text; QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210,
at 149 (noting that "the document [the draft convention and statute] differs substantially from
these earlier instruments").
233. Defined as those in which:
(1) All parts are naturally navigable to and from the sea of a waterway which in its
course, naturally navigable to and from the sea, separates or traverses different
States, and also any part of any other waterway naturally navigable to and from the
sea, which connects with the sea a waterway naturally navigable which separates or
traverses different States.
(2) Waterways, or parts of waterways, whether natural or artificial, expressly
declared to be placed under the regime of the General Convention regarding
navigable waterways of international concern either in unilateral acts of the States
under whose sovereignty or authority these waterways or parts of waterways are
situated, or in agreements made with the consent, in particular, of such States.
See Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern, supra note 230,
art. 1.
234. See QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 153.
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The Additional Protocol provided that its signatories ("on condition of
reciprocity ... and in time of peace") conceded either on "all navigable

waterways" or on "all naturally navigable waterways" not considered of
international concern but accessible to ordinary commercial navigation to and

from the sea, "perfect equality of treatment for the flags of any State
signatory of this Protocol as regards the transport of imports and exports
without transhipment."z3'

The Barcelona Conference also adopted recommendations on two other
matters for which documents had been submitted by the Commission,'
international regimes for ports and railways. 2' Subsequently, these were
also made the subject of conventions at the Second General Conference on
Communications and Transit, held at Geneva in 1923,
giving effect to the
23

"free transit" principles of the Barcelona Conference.

Case Relating to the TerritorialJurisdictionof the
InternationalCommission of the River Oder 39
This early freedom of transit case has obvious ramifications for the
development of international law dealing with landlocked and geographically
disadvantaged nations. It initially arose out of Article 341 of the Versailles
Treaty, establishing an International Commission for the Oder, one of whose
duties was to define the parts of the river which would be liable to the
General Convention to be drawn up under the terms of Article 338.'
[A]t the Fourth Session of the Commission, held at Swinemunde in July,
1922, the Polish delegate maintained that "the Warta should be internation-

alized from its confluence with the Oder up to the Polish frontier,". . . the
delegate for Prussia, on the contrary, submitted that if the principle of the
internationalization of tributaries was to be adapted, it must be integrally
maintained, and the navigable portions of tributaries situated in Polish

235. Additional Protocol, supra note 231.
236. See supra text at note 214; The sixth matter, the scheme for a Permanent Communications
and Transit Committee and a General Communications and Transit Conference, was also
adopted. See QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 140-43.
237. See QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 160, 163.
238. See id. at 160-68; Convention and Statute on the International Rdgime of Railways,
Geneva, December 9, 1923, 47 L.N.T.S. 55; Convention and Statute on the International
Rdgime of Maritime Ports, Geneva, December 9, 1923, 58 L.N.T.S. 285. It is particularly
noteworthy that paragraph (4) of the Signature of Protocol for the latter convention states that:
It is understood that the conditions of reciprocity laid down in article 2 of the
Statute... shall not exclude from the benefit of the said Statute Contracting States
which have no maritime ports and do not enjoy in any zone of a maritime port of
another State the rights mentioned in article 15 of the said Statute.
See QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra, at 168.

239. Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River
Oder, 1929 P.C.I.J., ser. A, no. 23 (Judgment of Aug. 15) [hereinafter River Oder Case].
240. Id. at 13.
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territory should be not excluded from the international river system. The
other delegates... more or less completely took the same view."
When a reconciliation proved impossible, the question was referred (under

Article 376 of the Versailles Treaty) to an Advisory and Technical Committee, whose suggestion for conciliation was rejected by Poland (Germany
reserved its opinion). 2 A Special Agreement was then drafted and signed
in October 30, 1928 to bring the question before the Permanent Court of
International Justice.'
As formulated, the controversy there presented
was:

(1) Does the jurisdiction of the International Commission of the Oder
extend to those portions of the Warthe (Warta) and the Netze (Noted),
tributaries of the Oder, which are situated in Polish territory?
(2) If so, what is the law that should govern the determination of the
upstream limits of this jurisdiction?'
As a preliminary matter, the Court noted that whether "Oder" in the
Treaty of Versailles included only that river, or the Oder and its tributaries,
in no way changed the terms of the controversy put before the Court under
the Special Agreement.' 4 The second matter then considered was whether
the Barcelona Convention might be invoked against Poland (a non-ratifying
state) by means of Article 338 of the Treaty of Versailles, allowing some
provisions of the treaty to be superseded by those of a future General
Convention (agreed to be that held at Barcelona).'
Arguing that Article
4 of the Barcelona Convention itself required ratification, the Court
concluded that this agreement had no role in the controversy, which should
be solved "solely on the basis of the Treaty of Versailles."' 7
Turning to the principal matter at hand, the Court noted that the special
clauses of the Treaty of Versailles "must not merely be read and interpreted
in the light of the general clauses, but also that they find in the latter a
natural complement."'
Article 341 of the Treaty, must thus be interpreted with reference to Article 331.

9

It is true-and on this point the Polish representatives have insisted
repeatedly and from different points of view-that what is called the
"regime of internationalization" of rivers ... is not necessarily bound up

241. Id. at 14.
242. Id. at 14-15.

243. Id. at 16.
244. Id. The court goes on to note that consideration of the second issue depends upon a
positive determination of the first.

245. Id. at 17.
246. Id. at 18-29. See also supra note 208.

247. Id. at 22.
248. Id. at 23.
249. Id.
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with the administration by an international commission. But it is nonetheless true that, when a Commission is set up, it is natural to suppose that
the territorial limits of the "regime" and of the "administration" by the
Commission . . . are coincident. Failing any contrary indication drawn
from the context, it must therefore be understood that the competence of
a river commission with such a function extends to all the internationalized
portions of the river and river system. 0

This, the Court held, was true in the present case. 1 "If the territorial
limits of the rdgime... and those of the Commission's administration are
the same ... , it follows that the question before the Court must be
determined according to the terms of Article 331 . . ."
"[T]he only
point at present in dispute is the meaning of the words 'all navigable parts
of these river systems
which naturally provide more than one State with
'5 3

access to the sea."'

The navigability of the Warthe... and the Netze ... in Polish territory
being assumed, the Court has to deal only with . .. whether that part of
the two tributaries which is above the German frontier may be regarded as
providing more than one State with access to the sea, in the sense of
Article 331 of the Treaty of Versailles.'

Rather than relying on textual arguments, 5 the Court decided to consider
"the principles governing international fluvial law in general and . . . what
position was adopted by the Treaty of Versailles in regard to these principles."'
If the common legal right is based on the existence of a navigable
waterway separating or traversing several States, it is evident that this common right extends to the whole navigable course of the river and does not
stop short at the last frontier; ....
It therefore remains to consider what is the position adopted in this matter
by the Treaty of Versailles. In contradistinction to most previous treaties
which limit the common legal right to riparian States, the Treaty of Versailles. . . adopted the position of complete internationalization, that is to
say, the free use of the river for all States, riparian or not ..... 257

Noting that "[tihe introduction of representatives of non-riparian Powers on
the river commissions is not exclusively or mainly due to the desire to afford

250. Id.
251. Id. at 23-24 (noting positive evidence in that Article 344(b) of the Convention "defines the
matters confided to the Commission's powers in a manner exactly corresponding to the r~gime
set out in Articles 332 to 337 ... which Article 332 in its turn expressly refers to Article 331").

252. Id. at 24.
253. Id. at 24-25.
254. id. at 25.
255. See id. at 26.

256. Id.
257. Id. at 27-28.
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a greater measure of protection to the interests of landlocked States," but is
rather the result of general interest in freedom of navigation,"8 the Court
went on to note that "Article 331 must therefore be interpreted in the light
of these principles, which leave no doubt that the internationalization of a
waterway traversing or separating different states does not stop short at the
last political frontier, but extends to the whole navigable river."'
Having
answered the first question in the affirmative,' the Court then quickly
disposed of the second. "It follows that the jurisdiction of the Commission
extends up to the points at which the Warthe ... and the Netze . . .cease
to be either naturally navigable or navigable by means of lateral channels or
canals .. ."'26

While the Court upheld transit rights in the River Oder Case, these were
based on a specific treaty and, for all their importance, did not herald a
general advance for landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states.
Indeed another transit decision, Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and
26 2 could
Poland (Railway Sector Landwarow-Kaisiadorys),
be cited as a
setback for free transit. The question before the Court in this controversy
was whether international engagements then in force required Lithuania to
open the above-named railway sector for traffic (it was part of the line
supplying the ports of Libau, Koningsberg, and Memel with traffic, and
Lithuania wished to keep it closed until a border dispute was solved).'
In its reasoning the Court decided that Article 23(e) of the Covenant of
the League of Nation did not imply any specific obligation for a member
State "to open any particularlines of communication."'"
Specific obligations can therefore only arise, as this text clearly states,
from "international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon,"
for instance from "general conventions to which other Powers may accede
at a later date," as is stated in the Preamble to the Barcelona Convention
on freedom of transit.'
The only applicable convention would be the Memel Convention between
Lithuania, France, Italy, the British Empire, and Japan, establishing the
regime of the territory and port of Memel."
Article 3 of Annex III
provided that the Lithuanian government "shall ensure the freedom of transit
by sea, by water or by rail, of traffic coming from or destined for the Memel

258. Id. at 28.
259. Id. at 29.
260. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
261. River Oder Case, supra note 239, at 31.
262. Lithuana v. Poland, 1931 P.C.I.J. 749, ser. A/B No. 34 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 15)
[hereinafter Railway Traffic Case].
263. See id.at 752.
264. Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 758.
266. (May 8, 1924), 29 L.N.T.S. 85.
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Territory or in transit..." and that, in this respect, it would conform with
the rules laid down by the Barcelona Convention.' 7 While Article 2 of the
Statute of Barcelona stated that contracting parties "shall facilitate free
transiting by rail or waterway, on routes in use convenientfor international
transit," this did not cover the railway or sector in dispute "since it only
affords communication with Memel by means of a detour or by means of
reloading on to barges at Kovno."'
Because of this, neither the Memel Convention nor the Statute of
Barcelona put Lithuania under an obligation to restore the LandwarowKaisiadorys railway sector and to open it to international traffic. Article 3
of the Memel Convention also specified that Lithuania would not apply the
stipulation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Barcelona Statute to traffic on the river
or to, from, or in the port of Memel "on the ground of the present political
Here, the Court noted,
relations between Lithuania and Poland."'
railways were not mentioned; "it is clear . . . that . . . [Lithuania might
invoke Article 7 of the Barcelona Statute] with regard to railways of
importance to the Memel territory." 2' Therefore, the Court unanimously
concluded, "the international engagements in force do not oblige Lithuania
in the present circumstances to take the necessary steps to open for traffic or
for certain categories of traffic the Landwarow-Kaisiadorys railway

sector. "271
POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was an attempt
to reduce tariffs and other trading barriers. Adopted on October 30, 1947,
it generally reaffirmed the principles of the Barcelona Convention.2' At
the same time that this agreement was prepared, however, a Charter of
World Trade was also drafted for submission to a conference in Havana.
This conference, which began in November 1947, had as its purpose the
establishment of an International Trade Organization (ITO) which was to
supervise a global trading system founded on free trade and private
enterprise. (In the event the charter was only ratified by one country and
Article 33 of the Havana Charter was in fact
never went into effect.)f
very similar to Article V of GATT, with a major difference. A new
paragraph 6 read:

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See Railway Traffic Case, supra note 262, at 758.
Id. at 758-59.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. at 760.

272. See Povolny, supra note 8, at 3; GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 22-23.

273. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 23.
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The Organization may undertake studies, make recommendations and
promote international agreement relating to the simplification of custom
regulations concerning traffic in transit, the equitable use of facilities
.requiredfor such transit and other measures designed to promote the
objectives of this Article. Members shall cooperate with each other
directly and through the Organization to this end.'
Commentary on this paragraph relates specifically to landlocked states:
If, as a result of negotiations in accordance with paragraph 6, a Member
grants to a country which has no direct access to the sea more ample
facilities than those already provided for in other paragraphs of article 33,
such special facilities may be limited to the land-locked country concerned
unless the Organization finds, on the complaint of any other Member, that
the withholding of the special facilities from the complaining Member
contravenes the most favoured nation Provisions of this Charter.'
This raised for the first time the Most Favoured Nation controversy which
was to prove one factor in the debates of the Fifth Committee at UNCLOS
1.276

The next post-war development resulted from friction between landlocked Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose borders were closed to transit in
1950 and again in 1955 due to a dispute over the status of Pushtunistan.
This led indirectly to the consideration of the status of certain Asian
landlocked states-Afghanistan, Nepal, and Laos-at the 12th session of the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in February, 1956.27
ECAFE approved a resolution "that the needs of land-locked Member States
and Members having no easy access to the sea in the matter of transit trade
be given full recognition by all Member States and that adequate facilities
therefore be accorded in terms of international law and practice in this
regard."'
Glassner notes "[tihis was the first time that a major international body gave special consideration to the 'needs' of land-locked states as
such. The word 'needs' is prominent here, and not 'rights,' but there is no
indication of a necessity for new rules or procedures. . ."'
A series of
recommendations followed in an ECAFE report on Problems of trade of

land-locked countries in Asia and the FarEast:
(1) That countries who have so far not acceded to the Barcelona Statute
of [sic] Freedom of Transit be urged to do so at an early date .... It may

274. See id. at 23-24; QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 24.
275. 9 WHITEMAN, supra note 209, at 1146; QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at
at 24.
276. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 23-24.
277. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 51-54. But see id. at 25 (giving 1949 and 1953 as the
years of closure).
278. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 25.
279. See id.; QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 187, at 27.
280. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 25.
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also be hoped that all the countries of the region would eventually join the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and thereby also accede to the
principles and articles relevant to the transit trade.
(2) That countries be urged to negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements
in conformity with the principles of the Barcelona Statute, the Havana
Charter and the GATr... [and] bear in mind.., also the necessity for
adopting concrete administrative procedures and practices... to facilitate
the implementation of the basic principles of freedom of transit.
(3) . . .that the officials and personnel handling or dealing with the
various phases of transit trade should receive proper training, not only in
the principles of transit trade but also in the relevant administrative aspects.
(4) ...the countries should include in their economic development plans,
plans for improvement of transport, development of new routes... which
will facilitate the transit trade between neighbouring and contiguous
countries and which will particularly provide additional transport for the
trade of land-locked countries. 2s 1
ECAFE served as the stimulus for the UN's consideration of free access,
and its eventual inclusion in the agenda of UNCLOS I.12
At the same
time, however, another regional body, the Organization of American States,
was considering this topic. At its Economic Conference in Buenos Aires in
August-September, 1957, two resolutions dealt with the status of landlocked
states. Resolution No. 23 on the Utilization of River Systems and Facilities
for Landlocked States noted:
WHEREAS:
Landlocked countries require, for the normal development of their
economic activities, suitable treatment that is designed to lessen the
drawbacks of their geographical position;
The Economic Conference of the Organization of American States
RESOLVES:
1. To recommend to the member states through which the rivers of a
system flow, that, in order to facilitate international traffic and stimulate
the economic development of such states, they enter into agreements to
arrange for a study of the international rivers under their jurisdiction, to
cover the technical aspects involved in their navigability and their industrial
and agricultural utilization, as well as the improvement of the transportation systems.
2. The adoption by the member states, with respect to land-locked
countries, of measures that will envisage:
a. The fullest freedom of transit, without taxes or limitations,
for commodities imported or exported by the said countries;
and
b. Nondiscrimination in the matter of domestic transportation
rules for goods in transit, except in those cases in which the
governments give special subsidies, no matter what their

281. Id. at 25-26; see also QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 29; 9 WHITEMAN,
supra note 209, at 1148.
282. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 26.
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form, to such transportation. The measures referring to this

subparagraph do not include air transportation.2

Resolution No. 38, adopted at the same Conference, dealt with Free Transit
for Landlocked Countries. Because "[t]he landlocked countries by utilizing
free-transit facilities, will be able to expand their foreign trade," it was
resolved "[t]o recommend to the governments of the member states that they
grant the greatest possible facilities to permit free transit in behalf of the
trade of the landlocked countries."'

UNCLOS I AND THE FIFTH COMMITrEE
While the draft articles submitted by the International Law Commission
(which formed the basis for the First United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea) to the United Nations General Assembly had no references to
landlocked states, an amendment to Resolution 1105 (XI) concerning the
convening of a Conference "included the specific recommendation that the
conference should study the question of free access to the sea of land-locked
countries, as established by international practice or treaties."'
In due
course a preliminary meeting of several landlocked states formulated a set of
principles concerning free access to the sea, referred to by some as the
Magna Cartaof landlocked states. These included seven major points which
dealt with:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

right of free access to the sea
right to fly a maritime flag
right of navigation
right to be applied in ports
right of free transit
right of states of transit
existing and future agreements'

While only a few of these points were fully accepted by the 1958 Conference, they served as useful aspirational goals and provided discussion points
for the Fifth Committee, which considered landlocked issues.'
Meetings of this Committee took place during February, March, and
April of 1958.111 As Mr. Zourek of Czechoslovakia, the Committee
283. 9 WHrTEMAN, supra note 209, at 114849.
284. Id. at 1149.
285. QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS, supra note 210, at 1; see also id. at 5-19.
286. See Caflisch, supra note 25, at 80; 9 WHrEMAN, supra note 209, at 1150-51 (giving a
full version of all seven points).
287. See Caflisch, supra note 25, at 80-81.
288. 7 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICIAL RECORDS [FIFTH
COMMITrEE (QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS TO THE SEA OF LAND-LOCKED COUNTRIES)], U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 13/40 (24 February-27 April 1958), at iui-iv.
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Chairman, noted in his opening address, the Fifth Committee was the only
group at UNCLOS I which did not base its work on an International Law
Commission Draft, and did not have the benefit of prior thorough study by
the General Assembly. In addition to the work of the Preliminary Conference of Land-locked States, however, the Committee did have before it a
written statement from Afghanistan's mission to the U.N., a January 1958
memorandum by the Swiss Government to UNCLOS I, and a series of draft
articles on the subject prepared by Czechoslovakia. Organizationally, the
Chairman suggested that a general debate should be allowed to air the views
of landlocked and coastal states, this to be followed by more specific
proposals to frame draft articles similar to those offered on other subjects by
the International Law Commission.'
After the general debate the Fifth Committee found itself roughly split
into three factions. One group made up of coastal states (largely, but not
exclusively European) favored the status quo-more accessions to the
Barcelona and Geneva Conventions, the use of bilateral treaties governing
access to the sea, and perhaps a general declaration of principles. At the
other pole were those landlocked countries, many of them (but not all) Third
World, who wished a separate convention on free access to the sea. In
between was an amorphous group of compromisers.'
On March 26 and 27, two different proposals were submitted to the Fifth
Committee. The first was known as the Nineteen Power Proposal. It was
sponsored by
Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, the
Byelo-russian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Hungary,
Iceland, Indonesia, Laos, Luxembourg, Nepal, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia,
Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic., 1 The second, or
Three Power Proposal, was the joint work of Italy, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom.'
The Nineteen Power Proposal was generally based on
the draft articles previously submitted by Czechoslovakia. Sections on Free
Zones in ports, settlement of international disputes and the effect of armed
conflicts which were present in the draft articles were, however, omitted,
while a section was added on landlocked states' rights in the territorial sea
and internal waters of a coastal state.'
The Three Power Proposal was
a radical departure from this framework. It recommended that the main
convention note specifically that landlocked states were included in its terms,
and that they had a right to flag vessels in the high seas concurrent with that
of other coastal states. Additionally, the Proposal recommended a resolution
on "Free Access to the Sea of Land-Locked Countries," which reiterated the

289. See id. at 2-4 (at 1-29).
290. See id. at 4-28 (at 1-29 (4th mtg.); 1-36 (5th mtg.); 1-25 (6th mtg.); 1-48 (7th mtg.); 1-36
(8th mtg.); 1-23 (9th mtg.), 1-38 (10th mtg.)).
291. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 5/L. 6.
292. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 5/L. 7.
293. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 5/L. 6, supra note 291; U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 51L.
I (Annexe 6).
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rights to be granted in the Convention, urging all states to sign the Barcelona
and Geneva conventions, and calling for bilateral agreements on the

subject. '
This set the stage for a showdown at the next Committee meeting. Some
claimed that the Nineteen Power Proposal was not in fact a proposal, but a
working paper.'
Supporters argued that on the basis of "prior in time,
prior in right," the Nineteen Power Proposal should be discussed first.'
Finally a compromise was proposed and adopted that both proposals should
be introduced and discussed together point by point. A working party of
landlocked, maritime, and maritime countries bordering on landlocked
neighbours was set up "on the principle of equitable geographic distribution"
to prepare a draft for the Committee to review.'
During discussions, the
United States offered an amendment liberalizing the Three Power Proposal
resolution by substituting phraseology recognizing the needs of landlocked
states and stating that they should be accorded adequate facilities for access
to the sea.'
This sparked a move to reconcile the two Proposals, with
Mr. Muller, the Swiss delegate offering a compromise.'
The first part
specifically made the provisions of the Convention applicable to landlocked
states. The second, which was key to the compromise, included the seven
principles by the Preliminary conference "in a flexible, condensed form; they
were in no sense demands." These would serve as "outline-law" for the
drawing up of necessary agreements."
With support from the United
States, Canada, and others it was decided to give priority to the study of the
Swiss proposal, over the Nineteen and Three Power Proposals and the
Report of the Working Party, 3" which involved a combination of parts of
the Nineteen and Three Power Proposals along with the United States' and
other amendments.'
The Three Power Proposal was subsequently
withdrawn by its sponsors in favor of the Swiss compromise.'
Subsequently a Five Power Amendment was offered by Bolivia, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States,
embodying certain changes to the Swiss compromise.'
Both this and the
compromise were adopted by the Fifth Committee as a whole, and served

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
at 45
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/C. 5/L. 7, supra note 292.
See U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/40, supra note 288, at 28-30 (at 1-32 (11th mtg.)).
See id.
See id. at 31 (at I (12th mtg.)).
See id. at 41 (at 2-3 (16th mtg.)).
See U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/C. 5/L. 15; U.N. Do. A/CONF. 13/40, supra note 288,
(at 1-4 (18th mtg.)).
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/40, supra note 288, at 45.
See A/CONF. 13/C. 5/L. 16.
See A/CONF. 13/40, supra note 288, at 48-51 (at 1-46 (20th mtg.)).
See id.at 51 (at 41 (20th mtg.)).
See U.N. Doe. ACONF. 13/C. 5/L. 26; U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/40, supra note 288,

at 55 (at 5 (23d mtg.)).
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as the basis for those articles concerning landlocked states embodied in the
UNCLOS I Conventions. 305
Two conventions resulting from UNCLOS I included promises relating
to landlocked countries. Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone noted that: "Subject to the provisions in these
articles, ships of all States-, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea."'
The Convention on the
High Seas produced three articles on the subject-Article 2 (noting that high
seas freedoms applied "both for coastal and non-coastal States"),' Article
4 ("every state whether coastal or not, has the right to sail ships under its
flag on the high seas"),' and Article 3. This reads in full:
1. In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with coastal
States, States having no sea-coast should have free access to the sea. To
this end States situated between the sea and a State having no sea-coast
shall by common agreement with the latter and in conformity with existing
international convention accord:
(a) To the State having no sea-coast, on a basis of reciprocity, free transit

through their territory; and
(b) To ships flying the flag of that State treatment equal to that accorded
to their own ships, or to the ships of any other States, as regards access to
seaports and the use of such ports.
2. States situated between the sea and a State having no sea-coast shall
settle, by mutual agreement with the latter, and taking into account the
rights ofthe coastal State or State of transit and the special conditions of
the State having no sea-coast, all matters relating to freedom of transit and
equal treatment in ports, in case such States are not already parties to
existing international conventions. 3°9
In retrospect it is clear that Glassner is correct in noting the "inherently
conservative approach" of UNCLOS I to the problem of landlocked
states.3 10 This appears to have been due to several factors. First, "discussions in the conference. . . revealed that there was no unanimous agreement
relating to these principles, especially the right of free transit."3 11 There
was not only a difference in theories on this latter point,312 but also on the

305. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/40, supra note 288, at 58 (at 58-59 (23d mtg.).
306. Geneva, April 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; 15 U.S.T. 1606; T.I.A.S. No. 5639
(emphasis added).
307. Geneva, April 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; 13 U.S.T. 2312; T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (emphasis

added).

308. Id. (emphasis added).

309. Id.
310. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 31.
311. Makil, supra note 8, at 44.
312. According to Mr. Thierry, the French representative:
Czechoslovakia maintained that the principle of freedom of transit was a simple
corollary of the freedom of the high seas, whereas the Swiss representative regarded
freedom of transit as a principle deriving from conventional international law-from
treaties relating to transit. For others ... [it] was an autonomous rule, district from
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way the committee should treat any law thus systemized-by convention, by
a statement of principles, or in some other manner.313 Finally it appears
that the concept may occasionally have been "held hostage" to extraneous
issues. Israel voiced concern with coastal or transit states which might refuse
to enter into necessary agreements. "That might happen when a State
attempted to exploit its geographical situation as means of exerting pressure
314
on a neighbouring State or of subjecting it to political blackmail."
Similarly, Pakistan's Zulfiquer Ali Bhutto noted that if landlocked countries
claimed the right of transit to the sea across the territory of a coastal state
they must admit that the same right should be granted "to countries which
were geographically divided and whose ports were separated by alien territo-

ries. -315
Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory (Portugal v. India)
In 1497 Vasco da Gama crowned years of Portuguese efforts by
circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope and opened a new trade route to
India. 316 From the early 16th century onward, it became Portuguese policy
to build fortresses at strategic coastal locations to control and protect this
trade.3 17 Although Portuguese fortunes declined with the arrival of the
Dutch and the English in the early 17th century, the Portuguese retained their
Indian settlements, which included Goa, Diu, and Daman (Damao)."'
Daman, the subject of the International Court of Justice case, consisted of
Damao, on the coast, and two enclaves; one small, Dadra, one larger, Nagar
Aveli (Nagar Havili). 3 1 The coastal territory was conquered by the
Portuguese in 1559 while their control over the internal districts resulted
from the Marathas' (Mahrattas) indemnifications for piracy in 1779.2

that of freedom of the high seas, but nevertheless forming part of international law.
One could also consider what place there was in international law for the controversial notion of international servitude held by certain authorities.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/40, supra note 288, at 13 (at 15 (6th mtg.)).
313. See id.(at 16 (6th mtg.)).

314. Id. at25 (pg. 11 (10th mtg.)).
315. Id. at 26 (at 21 (10th mtg.)).
316. See RICHARD HUMBLE, THE EXPLORERs 86-104 (1979).
317. See id.at 105-07.
318. See Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), [1960]
I.C.J. Rep. 6, at 27 (Judgment of Apr. 12) [hereinafter Right of Passage Case].

319. See id.at 27.
320. See L.D.S. [Laurence Duoley Stamp], Damdo, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 21
(1964); India: Daman and Diu and :Goa, in 21 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 152
(1991); Right of Passage Case, supra note 318, at 37-38; 78 (Armand-Ugon, J., dissenting).
See also Judge Koo and Judge Armand-Ugon's mention of inconclusive negotiations between the
Portuguese and the British for an exchange of land which would have allowed the uniting of
Nager-Aveli with Daman. Id. at 65 (Koo, J. seperate opinion); at 81 (Armand-Ugon, J.
dissenting).
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Daman, as part of the larger overseas province of Estado da India, was
subject to the governor general of Goa. 2
On August 15, 1947, India became independent, and on January 26,
1950, took its place as a federal republic within the British Commonwealth.'
As early as 1948 and 1949, the new nation made clear that it
laid claim to that part of the Portuguese overseas empire which lay on the
Indian subcontinent. 3
In 1950, a further approach by India sought
acceptance of the principle of integration, allowing for discussion as to ways
and means. Portugal refused to consider any transfer and India in turn noted
that it could not accept this refusal as a final disposition of the question.'
In January of 1953 India again raised the issue, stating that a direct transfer
was necessary, to be followed by a de facto transfer of the administration.
In the absence of a Portuguese reply, India notified Portugal in May that it
intended to close its Lisbon Legation and again stressed its views on the
future of Portugal's Indian possessions.'
A Portuguese reply refused to
discuss any transfer of authority, but requested India to reconsider its
intention to close the Legation. India then notified Portugal that its Legation
would be closed from June 11th, 1953.)
Four months later, India
prohibited the transit of armed Portuguese personnel across India's territory,
effectively starting the isolation of the Dadra and Nagar Aveli enclaves.327
By November 26, the pressure had increased; the governor of Daman,
European officials and the car of the Portuguese police were not allowed
access to Nagar Aveli without passports and Indian visas. Portugal noted
that this would hamper administration and that the measure was considered
to be unfriendly. 3' India in turn noted that it had been required to review
its policy because of Portugal's unfriendly attitude and the misuse of
concessions by Portuguese officials. India did, however, offer to grant
transit visas "as a very special case" to permanent Portuguese European
officials.'
Amid further protest notes from the Portuguese, India on
February 3rd, 1954 forbade most trans-shipments of arms and ammunition
to Portuguese territories through India.' z On June 13 vehicular transit
between Damao and the enclaves was interrupted by Indian authorities.33'
321. See India: Daman and Diu, supra note 320, at 152. See also Right of Passage Case,
supra note 318, at 55 (Koo, J. seperate opinion); L.D.S., supra note 320, at 21.
322. C.C.D. [Cuthbert Collin Davies] and X [the Editors], India [Indian Independence] in 12
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 150, at 178 (1964).
323. See India: Goa, supra note 320, at 152.
324. See Right of Passage Case, supra note 318, at 110-11 (Spender, J. dissenting). See also
id. at 65 (Koo, J. seperate opinion).
325. Id. at 111 (Spender, J. dissenting). See also id. at 65-66 (Koo, J., seperate opinion).
326. Id. at III (Spender, J., dissenting).
327. Id. (Spender, J., dissenting); see also id. at 141 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 111 (Spender, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 112 (Spender, J., dissenting).
330. Id. (Spender, J., dissenting).
331. Id. (Spender, J., dissenting); see also id. at 141 (Fernandes, J. dissenting).
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Some two weeks later imminent action was threatened in a manifesto by
anti-Portuguese groups which was reproduced in the Indian press. 32 On
July 17 India announced that it had "decided to make certain changes in the
concessions hitherto granted to the Portuguese administration at Daman and
Nagar-Aveli." Among other restrictions, this prohibited "the transport of
firearms, and ammunition and military stores by a Portuguese officer, or
intended for the Portuguese Indian Government, passing through Indian
territory." 33 On July 20 the Governor of Daman was not allowed to
proceed to Dadra and a regularly scheduled bus was forced to turn back from
the enclave. 3' On July 21, the Governor was allowed to pass through to
Dadra; according to India, the refusal of the previous day being attributed to
visa problems. 35 On the evening of the 21, a band of men entered Dadra
from India to take over the administration. Two Portuguese officers were
killed in the resulting melee and Portuguese resistance in this smaller enclave
was overcome. 31 India subsequently refused to grant any visas to Portuguese Europeans or Indians in the service of the Portuguese government
seeking to travel to either Dadra or Nagar Aveli.337 On July 23 the
President of the United Front of Goans, who had led the Dadra expedition,
announced that similar action would be undertaken against Nagar Aveli.3
On July 24, Portugal requested transit facilities for the dispatch of reinforcements to Dadra,'" and on the 26 also requested that (as few as three)
delegates of the Governor be allowed to proceed to Nagar Aveli to enter into
contact with the population, examine the situation, and take necessary
measures. (If possible this delegation was also to visit Dadra.) India refused
both requests in a note of July 28.'4
On July 29, the United Front's
expedition against Nagar Aveli commenced, although that enclave was not
completely subdued until August.4 1 Portugal subsequently brought its case
to the International Court of Justice in December, 1955.21
In its decision on the merits, the International Court of Justice summarized the matter before it as follows:

332. Id. at 13.
333. Id. at 112-13 (Spender, J., dissenting); see also id.at 13, 85 Armand-Ugon, J.,
dissenting); at 141 (Fernandes, J.dissenting).
334. Id.at 113 (Spender, J., dissenting); see also id. at 141 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 113 (Spender, J., dissenting).
336. Id.at 112 (Spender, J.,dissenting); see also id.at 13, 141 (Femandes, J. dissenting).
337. Id. at 113 (Spender, J.,dissenting); see also id. at 141 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
338. Id.at 13.
339. Id. at 14. See also id.at 141 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
340. Id.at 14.
341. Id.at 114 (Spender, J., dissenting); see also id. at 13, 141 (Femandes, J., dissenting).
342. Id.at 8-9. Viewing India's action (or lack of action) in a larger context, it is interesting
to note than in November, 1954 a vote of the elected representatives of the French Indian
municipalities transferred the administration of Pondicherry, a former French colony, to India.
This ended a long dispute over the territories' status. See India: Pondicherry, 21 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 320, at 156, 157.
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(1) The existence in 1954 of a right of passage in Portugal's favour to the
extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty over the enclaves [of
Dadra and Nagar Aveli], exercise of that right being regulated and
controlled by India;
(2) Failure by India in 1954 to fulfill its obligation in regard to that right
of passage;
(3) In the event of a finding of such failure, the remedy for the resulting
unlawful situation. 3
While granting that "the day-to-day exercise of the right of passage as
formulated by Portugal, with correlative obligation upon India, may give rise
to delicate questions of application," the Court nonetheless found that the
right "has, in the circumstances, been defined with sufficient precision to
enable the Court to pass upon it."'
Reviewing this question, the Court first determined that Portugal could
not claim sovereignty or a resultant right of passage based on the 1779

Treaty of Poona or on the sanads (decrees) issued by the Maratha ruler in
1783 and 1785. "The fact that the Portuguese had access to the villages for
the purpose of collecting revenue and in pursuit of that purpose exercised

such authority as had been delegated to them by the Marathas cannot, in the
view of the Court, be equated to a right of passage for the exercise of
sovereignty."'
At the time of the British takeover, however,
[t]hey [the British] accepted the situation as they found it and left the
Portuguese in occupation of, and in exercise of exclusive authority over,
the villages. The Portuguese held themselves out as sovereign over the
villages. The British did not, as successors of the Marathas, themselves
claim sovereignty, nor did they accord express recognition of Portuguese
sovereignty, over them .....
Portuguese sovereignty over the villages
was recognized by the British in fact and by implication and was subsequently tacitly recognized by India. As a consequence the villages comprised in the Maratha grant acquired the character of Portuguese enclaves
within Indian territory.
For the purpose of determining whether Portugal has established the right
of passage claimed by it, the Court must have regard to what happened
during the British and post-British periods. During these periods, there had
developed between the Portuguese and the territorial sovereign with regard
to passage to the enclaves a practice upon which Portugal relies for the
purpose of establishing the right of passage claimed by it.'

Examining practices during these periods, the Court concluded that "with
regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general there existed
a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman

343. Right of Passage Case, supra note 318, at 36.

344. Id. at 37.
345. Id. at 37-39.
346. Id. at 39.
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and the enclaves." As this had extended over a period of time, unaffected
by change of regime, the Court was "satisfied that the practice was accepted
as law by the Parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative
obligation."' 7 This, however, was not the case with armed forces, police,
and arms and ammunition.
[These] did not pass between Daman and the enclaves as of right and...
after 1878, such passage could only take place with previous authorization

• ..accorded either under a reciprocal arrangement already agreed to, or

in individual cases. Having regard to the special circumstances of the case,
this necessarily for authorization before passage could take place consti-

tutes, in the view of the Court, a negation of passage as of right. The
practice predicates that the territorial sovereign had the discretionary power
to withdraw or to refuse permission. It is argued that permission was
always granted, but this does not, in the opinion of the Court, affect the

legal position.'

The Court refused to examine either of these conclusions in the light of
customary international law; "[wihen. . .the Court finds a practice clearly
established between two States which was accepted by the Parties as
governing the relations between them, the Court must attribute decisive effect
to that practice for the purpose of determining their specific rights and
obligations" and it "must prevail over any general rules." 9
Having found the existence of a (restricted) right of passage, the Court
then turned to the question of whether India had failed in her obligations
regarding that right. In a surprisingly abbreviated argument, the Court found
that,
In view of the tension then prevailing in intervening Indian territory, the

Court is unable to hold that India's refusal of passage to the proposed
delesation and its refusal of visas to Portuguese nationals of European
origin and to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of the Portuguese

Government was action contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugal's
right of passage. Portugal's claim of a right is subject to full recognition

and exercise of Indian sovereignty over the intervening territory and
without any immunity in favour of Portugal ... India's refusal of passage
in those cases was, in the circumstances, covered by3 its power of
regulation and control of the right of passage of Portugal. '

Because of this decision, the third question was not reached. 351 The
Court's vote was 11-4 in favor of a right of passage for private persons, civil
officials, and goods, 8-7 against a similar right of passage for armed forces,

347. Id. at 39-40.

348. Id. at 40-43.
349. Id. at 44.
350. Id. at 4445.
351. See supra text at note 343.
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police, arms, and ammunition, and 9-6 that India had not acted contrary to
its obligations. 2
As should be evident from the voting record, the Court in the Right of
Passage Case was a fragmented one. Five judges filed declarations, one
filed a separate opinion, seven dissented. A perusal of these individual
statements gives further insights into the problem. Judge Spiropoulos
(Greece), for example, claimed that the setting up of a new autonomous
authority in the overrun enclaves put an end to the Portuguese right of
passage. 53 Judge V. K. Wellington Koo (Republic of China) felt that the
right of passage applied to Portuguese armed forces, armed police, and arms
and ammunition.'
"It appears clear to me that the basic element in the
policy of control and regulation of passage by the intervening territorial State
in the past was consideration in good faith of its own national interest." This
resulted in a common policy of control and regulation for all categories of
passage.35
Judge Koo thus believed that "Portugal's right of passage
between the enclaves between them and coastal Daman embraces all the six
categories, to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty
over the enclaves and subject to control and regulation by India.""
Judge Armond-Ugon (Uruguay), dissenting, noted that "the effectiveness
of the fact of passage should be regarded from the standpoint of its duration
and of its acceptance by the two Governments concerned. This effective
exercise of passage to the enclaves, regularly kept up, contributes towards
the establishment of a right. "357
If the principle of international freedom of transit scarcely encounters any
longer any prohibition of passage on the basis of territorial sovereignty,
stil[ less can that sovereignty be adduced as a reason for withdrawing a
long practiced right of transit to an enclave. The right of passage derived
from the 1779 Treaty and from more than a century of practice has its
foundation in local custom; there is therefore no need to consider whether
it finds support in other sources such as general custom or the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
The changes of circumstances in the enclaves, however, "affect the causes
which gave rise to the right of passage and must naturally have their effect
on the right of passage itself or on the ways in which it may be exercised."
The right had thus either been suspended or extinguished."5

352. Right of Passage Case, supra note 318, at 45-46.
353. Id. at 53 (Spiropoulos, J.declaration).

354. Id. at 54-63 (Koo, J., seperate opinion).
355. Id. at 63 (Koo, J., seperate opinion).
356. Id. at 68 (Koo, J., seperate opinion).
357. Id. at 82 (Armand-Ugon, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 84 (Armand-Ugon, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 87 Armand-Ugon, J.,dissenting).
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Judge Quintana (Argentina) also dissented, refusing to accept the
implication "that territorial sovereignty can be acquired by prescription. "3
"[T]he applicant fails to supply a firm and conclusive basis for its right when
it relies at one time upon a treaty, at another on custom, on a principle or,
alternatively, on legal doctrine." 1 "To support the Portuguese claim in
this case, which implies survival of the colonial system, without categorical
and conclusive proof is to fly in the face of the United Nations Charter." 2
Judge Quintana would therefore have dismissed the Portuguese claim. Judge
Percy Spender (Australia) felt "unable ... to agree that no right of passage
had been acquired . . . in respect of armed forces or armed police or arms

and ammunition, or that India did not act contrary to its obligation resulting
from the right of passage. . .

Sir Percy held that the record estab-

.,"

lished that a right of passage existed during the British and post-British
period. "A right of passage having been established, there was a correlative
obligation on India not to prevent the exercise of that passage; it could
regulate and control it; it could not prevent it or render it nugatory or
illusive."'
An examination of the evidence forces me to the conclusion that the
dominant purpose of India immediately after the events at Dadra, to which
all other considerations were subordinated, was to exclude the Portuguese
thenceforth from any further access to the enclaves. For reasons unconnected with any question of regulation or control of passage as such or of any
right of passage, it was not prepared to permit civil officials or any organ
of Government to pass to the enclaves under any circumstances and acted
accordingly
...
The qualification
of Portugal's right making it in its exercise subject
to
India's control and regulation affords in the circumstances no protection to
India. Breach of its international obligation has been established. In my
opinion the Court should have so found and should then have proceeded to
consider the resulting situation, and the contentions advanced by India to
the effect that any obligations with regard to passage binding on it in July,
1954 should be regarded as having lapsed or become unenforceable against
it as a result of events and circumstances which have since occurred. 5

Judge Chaga (ad hoc, India) in his dissent noted that if the Court ruled
in favor of Portugal, "the dispute

. . .

will not be determined by its...

decision. The Court will only be sowing seeds for future disputes and
discords."I He felt it was impossible for the Court to declare a right
which might be exercised not by any Court-mandated criteria, but "according

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

88 (Quintana, J., dissenting).
90 (Quintana, J., dissenting).
95 (Quintana, J., dissenting).
97 (Spender, J., dissenting).
110 (Spender, J., dissenting).
114-15 (Spender, J., dissenting).
120 (Chagla, J., dissenting).
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to the subjective determination of Portugal." 7 Distinguishing custom
from mere practice or usage requires a sense of obligation; the action or
forbearance must have "the same force as law."' Such a sense of custom
did not exist here.
The Barcelona Conference is imjprtant for the fact that, under Article 14
of the Convention, it was implicit that separate and special provisions with
regard to enclaves, including the enclave we are considering in this case,
were to be made by the countries concerned. There was no suggestion at
this Conference, by Portugal, that she had any right of transit.'
While Portugal might have faced the necessity of maintaining contact with
her enclave, there was no sense "on the other side of an obligation to respect
this necessity." 3" Thus Portugal was not entitled to any relief.
Finally, there is the dissent of Judge Fernandes (ad hoc, Portugal):
In the present case, the requirement at certain times of authorization for
the passage of elements of the police and armed forces was dictated by
precisely those "considerations of security" referred to in the Judgment in
connection with certain restrictions imposed on the transit of goods. It is
difficult to see why restrictions based on such considerations should be
compatible with a right of transit in respect of goods and not in respect of

other categories of transit.

Iam unable to accept the view that there can be no right where there is

reciprocity. Most of the rights recognized between nations rest on a basis
of reciprocity; they do not thereby lose their real character of rights. Not
only is reciprocity not incompatible with such rights; it is the very

condition for their effectiveness. The right which Portugal is claiming for
itself is exactly the same as the right Portugal recognized India to possess
for the purposes of communicating with its enclave of Meghwal situated
inside Portuguese territory.37'

To prevent essential communications was a failure to respect the sovereignty
depending on them; "[tihere is not much difference, it was said at the
hearings, between shooting a man dead and causing his death by strangulation. "
Fernandes argued that India's obligation arose from a legal
necessity imposed by geography, and cited the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case (1951) as "recognizing the legal implications of geographical
facts." 3" Noting that "the state of tension existing in Indian territory at the
time . . . was a result of. . . [India's] own fault and, in particular, of the
negligence of its authorities in the face of the preparation on its own territory

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(Chagla, J., dissenting).
(Chagla, J., dissenting).
at 121 (Chagla, J., dissenting).
at 121-22 (Chagla, J., dissenting).
at 133-34 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
at 137 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
at 138 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
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of acts of aggression directed against Portuguese territory, " ' the Judge
concluded that Portugal did possess a right of transit, that this included a
right of passage for arms and forces necessary to exercise police functions,
and that India's actions were contrary to the legal obligations it owed
Portugal."'
In 1955, satyagrahis (non-violent resisters) from India attempted to
continue the assimilation of Portugal's remaining Indian territories. Initially
these intruders were merely deported, but later the Portuguese responded
with force. and casualties resulted.376 On August 18, 1955 (before the
presentation of the Right of Passage Case to the International Court of
Justice), relations between the two nations were severed. 3" The Court's
decision was rendered in April, 1960.31' On December 18, 1961, India's
armed forces invaded and occupied Damano, Diu, and Goa. 3 9 It is open
to argument what role the Court's divided opinion played in this subsequent
development.
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AND
T.f CoNvENvmoN ON TRANSIT TRADE OF LANDLOCKED STATES

Professor Glassner traces the UNCTAD initiative and the Convention on
Transit Trade of Landlocked States to a post-1958 increase in the number of
landlocked notions and to continuing "interference with and threats to free
transit. .. "
The 1963 ECAFE Ministerial Conference "'recognized the
right of free transit for land-locked countries,'" 3 " while a meeting the
following year "strongly recommend[ed] ... that the subject be given urgent
and sympathetic consideration at the forthcoming United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development. . ." because of the critical importance of access
to the sea for economic development. 3 2
This was done by a subcommittee of UNCTAD I in 1964, which
resulted in the adopting of eight principles relating to the transit trade of

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
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380.
381.
382.

Id. at 142 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 143-44 (Fernandes, J., dissenting).
See India: Goa, supra note 320, at 152.
Id.
See Right of Passage Case, supra note 318, at 6.
See India:Goa, supra note 320, at 153. Portuguese India was officially incorporated into
by a constitutional amendment in 1962. Id.
See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 32.
Makil, supra note 8, at 44.
GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 32.
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landlocked countries." This credo, subsequently appeared in the preamble
of the Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked states:
I. The recognition of the right of each land-locked state of free access to
the sea is an essential principle for the expansion of international trade and
economic development.
II. In territorial and on internal waters, vessels flying the flag of landlocked countries should have identical rights, and enjoy treatment identical
to that enjoyed by vessels flying the flag of coastal states other than the
territorial state.
III. In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with coastal
states, states having no sea-coast should have free access to the sea. To
this end states situated between the sea and a state having no sea-coast
shall, by common agreement with the latter, and in conformity with
existing international conventions, accord to ships flying the flag of that
state treatment equal to that accorded to their own ships or to the ships of
any other state as regards access to seaports and the use of such ports.
IV. In order to promote fully the economic development of the landlocked countries, the said countries should be afforded by all states, on the
basis of reciprocity, free and unrestricted transit, in such a manner that
they have free access to regional and international trade in all circumstances and for every type of goods.
Goods in transit should not be subject to any customs duty.
Means of transport in transit should not be subject to special taxes or
charges higher than those levied for the use of means of transport of the
transit country.
V. The state of transit, while maintaining full sovereignty over its
territory, shall have the right to take all indispensable measures to ensure
that the exercise of the rights of free and unrestricted transit shall in not
way infringe its legitimate interests of any kind.
VI In order to accelerate the evolution of a universal approach to the
solution of the special and particular problems of trade and development
of land-locked countries in the different geographical areas, the conclusion
of regional and other international agreements in this regard should be
encouraged by all states.
VII. The facilities and special rights accorded to land-locked countries in
view of their special geographical position are excluded from the operation
of the most-favored-nation clause.
VIII. The principles which govern the right of free access to the sea of
the land-locked state shall in no way abrogate existing agreements between
two or more contracting parties concerning the problems, nor shall they
raise an obstacle as regards the conclusion of such agreements in the
future, provided that the latter do not establish a regime which is less
favourable than or opposed to the above-mentioned provisions. 3'

Along with the Eight Principles the subcommittee unanimously adopted a
recommendation that a committee of twenty-four members be appointed by

383. Povolny notes that these improved on the "Landlocked Magna Carta," supra text at 286,
in two main ways, "first, that landlocked and coastal countries should be encouraged to conclude
regional agreements; and second, that facilities ... and special rights granted to landlocked
countries should be excluded from the operation of the most-favored-nation clause." Povolny,
supra note 8, at 3. See also GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 33-34.
384. Makil, supra note 8, at 45. See also 9 WHITEMAN, supra note 209, at 1154-55.
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the Secretary-General to prepare a new draft convention." This appears
to have been a compromise between approaches favored by different sections
of the subcommittee. While agreed that the Barcelona Conventions needed
modification, "Bolivia, Paraguay, the African land-locked states and others

wanted a convention completed by the Conference.'"

Chile, Peru, the

European states and other felt that the Conference was not equipped with
legal experts and background information ... and wanted [a convention]
... prepared by a commission of international jurists and other legal
experts. 3
Taking the Afro-Asian draft treaty as a starting point (itself based on the
Barcelona Convention) and factoring in "the principles of international law
included in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas as well as conventions and
agreement regarding transit trade currently in force and submissions by
Governments," 38 1 a draft convention on Transit Trade was prepared in
October and November of 1964. s On June 7, 1965, the United Nations
Conference on Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries was convened.90
The operation of the conference is well-described by Prof. Glassner, who
notes that assignment to committees and other functions was not by region,
but rather by landlocked, transit, or "other" status.31
There were vigorous debates ... on everything from whether free access
to the sea was an inherent right... or whether the task of the Conference
was merely to resolve technical problems of transit traffic, to whether the
Convention should specify the procedures for clearing in-transit goods
through customs. While all speakers gave lip-service to the necessity for
the freest possible transit for land-locked countries, it was evident that few
delegates were willing to surrender much of their own "sovereignty" in
order to achieve this. Moreover, not even the land-locked states agreed
among themselves on the urgency for and scope of a new Convention.
Broadly speaking, the European land-locked states had few complaints,
while those of Africa, Asia and South America were most vigorous in
seeking broader rights and guarantees for the land-locked states. Likewise,
some transit states were more understanding and cooperative than
3

others. '

385. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 34.
386. A draft convention, originally prepared by Nepal, Laos, and Afghanistan with the help of
the ECAFE Secretariat, had subsequently been co-sponsored by eight landlocked African nations.
See id. at 32-33.
387. Id. at 33, who notes the difference in approach between Chile and Bolivia. See supra
notes 164-96 and accompanying text.
388. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 34.
389. Makil, supra note 8, at 46.
390. GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 35.

391. Id. at 37. He goes on to note that "[t]his division was blurred, however, by the fact that
some of the land-locked states were also transit states, as were some of the 'other' states." Id.
392. Id. at 36-37 (notes omitted).
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The resulting Convention, 3" while based on the Barcelona models, is more
limited in scope, dealing with land-locked countries and their access to the
sea." Because of this it served to highlight the problems of geographically disadvantaged states,3 indicating a greater awareness of the plight of
such countries along with the counter of a stiffened resolution from some
transit states. 3
It enshrines the exclusion from operation of the "mostfavoured-nation" clause,"' but according to others "'contains little which
is new, and no radical innovations or breakthroughs.'" 3M Noting that 'the
developing land-locked states were far from completely satisfied with it,"
Glassner labeled the Convention (in 1970) as "the latest, but not the last,
word on the subject."'
THE SEABED COMMrIrrEE AND UNCLOS III:
THE EVOLUTION OF AN INTEREST GROUP
This leads to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, and the resulting 1982 Convention, which form the terminus post quem
of this study. Before concluding this historical survey, however, something
might usefully be said about the origins of the group of landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged states which were destined to play a major role
at UNCLOS III. A major problem in defining the composition of this group,
both at sessions of the Seabed Committee and UNCLOS III results from
differing perceptions of what constitutes a "geographically disadvantaged"
state. Estimates of potential qualifiers during the negotiations range from 60
to almost 100, but it is generally agreed that even the working number of
42-52 or 53 members, voting together, would have been sufficient to block
any decision made at the Conference, as this constituted over 1/3 of the
voting membership. ° While landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
states had worked together as early as the Seabed Committee, it was not until
the 1974 Caracas session of the Conference that a distinct interest group of
forty-two members evolved. It grew to forty-nine in Geneva, and topped
fifty in New York, despite having rejected or pended the application of

393. See Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States, New York, July 8, 1965, 597

U.N.T.S. 42, 19 U.S.T. 7383, T.I.A.S. No. 6592.
394. Makil, supra note 8, at 48.
395. See id.; GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 37.
396. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 37.
397. See Makil, supra note 8, at 48.
398. See GLASSNER, supra note 6, at 37.
399. Id. at 38.
400. See Janusz Symonides, Geographically DisadvantagedStates and the New Law of the Sea,
8 PO1SH Y.B. INT'L L. [551-57 (1976); S. Jayakumar, The Issue of the Rights of Landlocked
and GeographicallyDisadvantagedStates in the Living Resources of the Economic Zone, 18 VA.
J. INT'L L. [69], at 70 (1978-79); Caflisch, supra note 8, at 346-50; Povolny, supra note 8, at

4.
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certain political players (Israel and Iran). 1 Of the total, about 2/3 of the
membership were developing countries, 1/3 developed.'
Certainly one source of this grouping can be traced to disappointment
with the 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States, which
despite (or perhaps because of) its favorable provisions for landlocked states,
attracted fewer coastal state signatories than had been anticipated.' Work
on access problems continued in 1968-70, with a Working Group reporting
to UNCTAD.1' Increasingly, however, affected states saw the evolving
Seabed Committee negotiations as an alternate international forum in which
they could usefully present their problems.'
U.N. Resolution 2750 B (XXV), proposed in December of 1970 by
twelve landlocked nations, called for an up to date study of free access to the
sea and a report on the special problems of landlocked states in the
exploration and exploitation of deep ocean resources."
This report was
prepared in June of 1971 and presented to the summer session of the Seabed
Committee.' ° At the same time, a group of seven landlocked and shelflocked states were responsible for submitting a joint proposal on the deep
seabed; all feared that the idea of a broad, legally recognized continental
shelf (favored by some coastal states) would drastically reduce the economic
significance of the international seabed area.'
By 1973 further developments had occurred among this group. Several
draft articles, proposed by landlocked countries, disadvantaged states, or
sympathizers dealt with fishing and the use of the economic zones of coastal
states by their less fortunate brethren. Particularly popular was the concept
of regional arrangements allowing for a "sharing of the wealth" in discrete
geographical areas.'
The 1973 Seabed Committee session also saw the
first raising of free access, with two major draft article proposals being
offered on this subject. A Bolivian proposal was summarized by Oda as
follows:
.(i) the right of land-locked States to free access to the sea is one of the

basic principles of the law of the sea and forms an integral part of
international law. (ii) the right of land-locked States to free access to the
sea derives from the principles of the freedom of the sea and the designa-

401. Symonides, supra note 400, at 59.

402. Id. at 59-69.
403. See Maidl, supra note 8, at 50.
404. See R.T. McKinnell, Land-locked Countries: A Test for UNCTAD III? 6 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 227 at 230 (1972).
405. See Childs, supra note 8, at 702-02; Jayakumar, supra note 398, at [69]-71.
406. SHIGERU ODA, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN OUR TIME-I: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, 1966-1975,
at 82-83 (1977); SMGERU ODA, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN OUR TIME-II: THE UNITED NATiONS
SEABED CoMMITrEE 1968-1973, at 13940 (1977) [hereinafter 1977b].
407. ODA (1977b), supra note 406, at 161.
408. See A/AC.138/37. See also ODA (1977b), supra note 406, at 164-65.
409. ODA (1977b), supra note 406, at 276-78.
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tion of the deep ocean floor and its resources as well, as the common
heritage of mankind, and its validity and application do not depend
exclusively on the unilateral will of States situated between the sea and
land-locked States, but concern the community of nations as a whole.
However, its exercise should be governed by agreement between the
land-locked States and the States situated between them and the sea. (iii)
States situated between the sea and land-locked countries should guarantee:
(a) free and unrestricted transit through their territory; (b) for vessels of
the land-locked State, the same treatment as that given to their own vessels
or vessels of any other State in respect of entry into and departure from
seaports; (c) the use of such ports and equipment as may be appropriate for
the movement of traffic, under the same conditions as for themselves; (d)
alternatively, free zones in the ports in which land-locked States may erect
warehouses, and other necessary facilities; (e) the right to appoint, in the
ports of transit or free zones, national customs officials who may authorize
the docking of vessels whose cargo is destined for, or originates primarily
in, the land-locked country, and organize such services as may be
necessary; and (f) the use of the means of transport and communication
existing in their territory, under the same conditions as for themselves.
Goods and passengers in transit to or from the land-locked State should not
be subject to the judicial authorities of the coastal transit State. (iv) In
connection with the rights and interests of land-locked States, the reciprocity of free transit is not an essential principle but may be agreed among the
parties. (v) With regard to the use of the deep ocean floor, the interests
and needs of the developing countries, especially those which are
land-locked, are stressed. (vi) The land-locked (developing) countries
should have the same obligations and rights as contiguous (developing)
coastal States with regard to the living resources of the seas adjacent to the
region, and the natural resources of the continental shelf and of the seabed
within the limits of the jurisdictional sea (exclusive economic zone).4 "
A later proposal was the joint product of Bolivia and six other land-locked
countries--Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mali, Nepal, and Zambia.
This provided:
. .(i) the right of free access to the sea is one of the essential principles
of the law of the sea and forms an integral part of international law, which
derives from the fundamental principles of freedom of the high seas and
has further been strengthened by the principle of the area as the common
heritage of mankind. (ii) On the high seas, in the territorial sea and in
internal waters, vessels flying the flag of land-locked States should have
identical rights and enjoy treatment equal to that enjoyed by vessels of
coastal States. Vessels of a land-locked State should have the right to use
maritime ports and are entitled to the most favored treatment, and should
under no circumstances receive treatment less favorable than that accorded
to vessels of coastal States as regards access to the maritime ports and the
use of facilities, installations and equipment. (iii) With respect to customs
duties and other charges, free zones and the right to appoint customs
officials, more detailed provisions are made in line with the Bolivian
proposal. (iv) The right of access to the sea through rivers is provided for.
(v) The transit State should have the right to take measures to ensure that
the right of free transit does not infringe its legitimate interests. The
principle of freedom of transit must be observed to the utmost possible
*

410. Id. at 294-96. See also A/AC. 138/92.
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extent. With regard to the reciprocity of free transit, the relevant provision
is the same as m the Bolivian proposal. (vi) Land-locked States should
have free access to the seabed in order to enable them to participate in its
exploitation and for this purpose the land-locked States should have the
right to use all means and facilities with regard to traffic in transit. In any

organ of the international seabed machinery, in particular in its Council,
there should be a proportionate number of land-locked States, both
developing and developed. Moreover, in any organ of the machinery,
decisions on questions of substance should be made with regard to the
special needs and problems
of land-locked States. (vii) Settlement of
tes is compulsory4
When UNCLOS III officially opened, a committee group of landlocked states
was prepared to argue for an expansion of their rights, and to preach the
gospel of geographical disadvantage to a larger group of similarly-situated
nations.
CONCLUSION

The contemporary problem of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, which has played a role in the UNCLOS III negotiations and in
the resulting 1982 Convention has been shown to be more than a 20th
century phenomenon, having deep roots in the world's political and economic
history. Geographic factors inhibiting access to the sea have been shown as
key to both "successes" and "failures" relating to actual development;
countries such as Bactria appear to have fallen because of their landlocked
status, others, like San Marino have thrived, Russia's expansion was
predicated in part on the impulse to the sea, while Bolivia has survived even
Bilateral and multilateral
though a similar push has been thwarted.
conventions, while important, have been shown to play only a partial role in
this intricate process. Treaties such as that of Versailles have both helped
and harmed. One aspect which it is hoped has come through is the sheer
variety and complexity of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states
and their reactions with transit nations, and the consequent likelihood that no
single treaty or group of treaties will solve all the related problems. With
the recent disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Yugoslavia,
the number of landlocked states has been increased and the potential that
friction will develop, enhanced. The time is ripe, therefore, for more
work-both practical and academic-so that a future Odysseus will nowhere
find a place which does not recognize, and appreciate, his oar.

411. ODA (1977b), supra note 406, at 296-97; see also A/AC. 138/93.
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